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Abstract
Insurance market failures are common in developing countries and one commonly
proposed explanation for this is the presence of asymmetric information. In this
paper I test for the relative importance of adverse selection and moral hazard for
car insurance using a randomised experiment at the largest insurance company in
Mongolia, randomly upgrading low coverage buyers to a higher coverage. With this
experiment, I find significant ex-ante adverse selection for third party and theft risks,
while there is no evidence of ex-post moral hazard for either risk. Moreover, I find no
evidence of adverse selection or moral hazard for coverages differing in co-payment
rates. I also discuss how certain market features, likely to be perceived as specific to
this context, are common in other insurance markets in developing countries, and
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Identification of Adverse Selection and Moral
Hazard: Evidence From a Randomised
Experiment in Mongolia
I Introduction
Insurance market inefficiencies are common in poor countries, which are often char-
acterised by thin or even missing formal insurance markets. One potential expla-
nation for this is that informational asymmetries, in particular adverse selection
and moral hazard, might be more relevant in developing countries. These informa-
tional asymmetries, when more prevalent, can undermine the potential for insurance
markets to provide insurance, specially for lower risk individuals (see Rothschild &
Stiglitz 1976; Wilson 1977; Pauly 1968; Zeckhauser 1970; Spence & Zeckhauser
1971).
Given the importance of understanding such market failures, a large literature
developed through testing for the joint presence of adverse selection and moral haz-
ard by testing whether individuals with higher insurance coverage are also riskier
(also called conditional correlation approach, used in Chiappori & Salanie´ 2000;
Dahlby 1983, 1992; Puelz & Snow 1994; Richadeau 1999; Cohen 2005). Yet, ad-
verse selection and moral hazard have considerably different implications in terms
of optimal policy and firm behaviour. Firms react to adverse selection by offering
menus of policies with higher and lower coverage; while responding to moral hazard
by forcing individuals to bear a higher share of costs (Feldstein 1993; Gruber 2006).
If significant adverse selection is present in the market, governments may consider
making insurance more affordable by, for instance, mandating insurance coverage or
offering tax subsidies to insurance providers (Gruber 1994, 2001, 2008); this is cer-
tainly not the case where there is moral hazard (see Arrow 1963; Pauly 1968, 1974;
Nyman 1999). In this sense, to better understand these insurance market failures
and therefore design better policies, it is important to devise tests that distinguish
between adverse selection and moral hazard.
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This paper presents the results of an experiment implemented at the largest
insurance provider in Mongolia, Mongol Daatgal, LLC., aimed at distinguishing be-
tween adverse selection and moral hazard for different types of risks covered by a car
insurance product. Car insurance makes up an important part of the non-life insur-
ance industry in most countries1, and is especially relevant for insurance providers
in poor countries (for an early review presenting cross country data on insurance
markets, see “Insurance in Developing Countries: an Assessment and Review of De-
velopments”, UNCTAD 1993); additionally, car accidents are a significant source of
risk for individuals in developing countries, as captured by the death rates in road
accidents and by data suggesting lower enforcement and financing of policies for road
safety (see the Global Status Report on Road Safety 2013, from the World Health
Organization)2. By looking at Mongolia, I aim to illustrate how informational asym-
metries might present themselves in an insurance market with some features similar
to those in other developing countries - for instance, providers lacking capacity to
design carefully specified contingent pricing, consumers being unaware of, distrust-
ful or inexperienced in insurance, as well as a large degree of informal risk-sharing
arrangements3. Potentially, these are also explanations for why formal insurance
penetration is low in new markets.
More precisely, I look at a context where the typical car insurance product pre-
scribes a coverage against a combination of three different vehicle risks (collision,
third party and theft), specifying a co-insurance rate and a premium. For each cus-
tomer arriving at the firm, the experiment first allows consumers to choose freely
among alternative coverages, and then randomly offers free additional coverage for
risks (or a lower co-insurance rate) that were not initially purchased. Later on in the
experiment, these customers were surveyed on their insurance histories, unclaimed
1For instance, for the UK (in 2005) and the US (in 2008) net written premiums account for
26% of net premiums for non-life insurance. Source: https://stats.oecd.org/
2In particular, death rates in road accidents amount to 18.3/20.1 per 100,000 in low/middle
income countries, while amounting to 8.7 per 100,000 in high income countries, see the Global
Status Report on Road Safety, WHO, 2013.
3Lack of underwriting expertise and statistical data contributing to bad pricing has been men-
tioned as issues specific to developing countries in the aforementioned UNCTAD report.
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accidents and their experiences with the experimental car insurance.
With this experiment, we can then proceed to test separately for the presence
of adverse selection - namely, for whether individuals with higher riskiness tend to
self-select into higher coverages - and moral hazard - namely, for whether individuals
respond to an increase in coverage by reducing effort and, consequently, becoming
more risky. Particularly, the experimental procedure allows me to test for adverse
selection by testing for whether customers selecting no coverage against a certain
risk but being awarded such coverage by the experiment have lower risk than indi-
viduals who have initially chosen to get covered against that risk. If this is the case,
it can be concluded that given the incentives to exert effort (after all, both groups
of individuals here end up in the same coverage), individuals with higher riskiness
tend to buy higher coverage more often. Similarly, to test for moral hazard, I can
use the experiment to test for whether there is an increase in riskiness in response to
random increases in coverage. If this is the case, we can say that individuals causally
respond to upgrades in coverage by having higher riskiness. The above experimental
design allows me to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard for two
of the three risks above (third party and theft).
The tests significantly indicate that there is adverse selection in both third party
(TP from here onwards) and theft risks. In particular, holding final contract con-
stant, those who chose TP coverage are 50% more likely to make a claim in TP than
those who chose not to get insured against TP but received TP coverage. Similarly,
those who self-selected in coverage against theft are around 50% more likely to have
incurred theft (over the past three years) than those who opted for insurance ex-
cluding theft coverage but ended up covered for theft due to the randomisation. The
adverse selection results for TP are robust to using different measures of accidents
as well as adding a wide range of controls; on the other hand, the theft results are
harder to capture without also using data on history of accidents, primarily due to
theft claims being rare.
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Overall, there is no robust evidence of moral hazard for either TP or theft. A
priori, those who were given coverage upgrades - becoming covered for TP acci-
dents - are naturally more likely to successfully make TP claims simply because
they have the right to claim. In this sense, performing the moral hazard test with
only claims data would wrongly suggest there is moral hazard simply because such
a test would be comparing claims for those who were upgraded in coverage (which
are not zero) with claims for those who did not receive upgrades in coverage (which
are necessarily zero). To address this, I first look at the sum of claimed and un-
claimed accidents - the total number of accidents - as provided by the survey data.
Under this measure of riskiness, individuals who were upgraded are as likely to have
TP accidents as the individuals who did not get upgrades. A similar result holds
for theft. Hence, coverage upgrades do not seem to have a causal impact over the
total number of accidents. One might suggest that the firm does not care, however,
about unclaimed accidents. To compare upgraded individuals with non-upgraded
individuals on the basis of “accidents that would be claimed if they were covered”,
I eliminate from the previous accident measure (summing claimed and unclaimed
accidents) the accidents where insurees did not know the size of the damage, due to
the accident being too small to consider. That is, this measure of riskiness considers
only claimed and unclaimed accidents for which insurees know the monetary size
of the damage, which could arguably capture accidents that insurees would claim.
Even when looking at this measure of riskiness, I do not find evidence of moral
hazard for either TP accidents or theft.
These results, naturally, could be specific to the context that I am analysing: an
experimental product in an insurance market in a developing country where the firm
(i) has difficulties writing down contingent prices, (ii) faces relatively little compe-
tition, and (iii) provides insurance to individuals who are relatively inexperienced
in/distrustful of insurance and often have informal risk-sharing arrangements. To-
wards the end of the paper, I then offer a discussion on how these particularities of
the context might affect the baseline findings.
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In particular, it is possible that the sizeable adverse selection result is a conse-
quence of the relative absence of contingent pricing. For instance, age is considered
as an important risk factor and employed in pricing for a wide range of insurance
products by providers in rich economies. While Mongol Daatgal, LLC., can observe
age (among other potential risk factors), it does not adjust individual premiums
according to the driver’s age. In our context, older insurees both are less risky
and demand less insurance for third party risks, therefore the firm’s introduction of
higher prices for young drivers can potentially weaken adverse selection. If that is
the case, then adverse selection is not driven fully by presence of private information,
but through the firm’s “bad” pricing. Yet, I show that the adverse selection results
are largely unchanged once all observables, recorded in the contracts but ignored in
the firm’s pricing model, are controlled for. Moreover, while some of these variables
are significantly correlated with accidents, they still have relatively little predictive
power over them. This suggests that either the firm is not collecting enough infor-
mation about individuals or that despite further data collection efforts, there is still
a large unobservable component in individual’s inherent riskiness. While it might
still be that the introduction of contingent pricing would change the reduced form
coefficients (and that to fully answer this question, I would need better knowledge
of the structure of demand), overall, the above exercises suggest that for individ-
uals with given observable characteristics, I can still significantly detect adverse
selection. This suggests that implementing pricing contingent on currently avail-
able individual- or vehicle-specific variables might not go a long way in eliminating
problems of adverse selection. This is consistent with recent literature in insurance
markets suggesting that improving pricing brings only modest welfare gains (see
Einav et al. 2010a, Bundorf et al. 2008; for a review, Levin 2001, Einav et al.
2010c).
Similarly, I consider the possibility that the sizeable adverse selection is present
partially due to the market under consideration being relatively uncompetitive, with
few large firms and many consumers claiming to not having searched around for al-
ternative providers. I argue that while statistics on market shares suggest less than
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perfect competition, firms may actually be facing differential competition for dif-
ferent types of coverages offered , even within the same car insurance product. In
particular, the firm under consideration seems to face higher price competition for
more basic coverages, as it is making losses on these, and has a considerable profit
margin for its more comprehensive coverages. Since I find adverse selection both
for unprofitable and profitable products, it seems unlikely that results are driven
fully by competition. I also argue that even if adverse selection is more likely to be
detectable in competitive environments, this is even more relevant to the present
study, as failures at the market level due to asymmetric information are likely to be
exacerbated by competition (Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976). Finally, I present prelim-
inary exercises to check whether within Mongol Daatgal, LLC., consumers display
differential adverse selection depending on their search behaviour. While this is only
suggestive and does not imply any causal relationship, it seems that there are no
significant differences between these consumers.
Finally, in our setting, the survey data suggests that a considerable group of
individuals did not get payouts for claims, would not recommend their current in-
surance product to their family, and broadly, when asked so, answer that they do not
trust the insurance company. With this in mind, I check whether baseline adverse
selection and moral hazard interact with individuals’ degree of distrust in insurance,
measured as an indicator of whether individuals either claim to not trust the com-
pany, claim they would not recommend the insurance product to their family, or
claim they have not received any payout after making a claim. One might expect
that those who trust that insurance pays out as expected might display higher ad-
verse selection than those who distrust insurance, basing their coverage choices more
on inherent risk and less on factors related to trust. One might also expect that our
measure of moral hazard might underestimate the true extent of moral hazard, if
distrustful buyers are present, who are less likely to respond to random upgrades to
insurance coverage. Overall, for adverse selection, it seems that those who distrust
are both less likely to make claims in case of an accident and adversely select more.
As for moral hazard, at least for the co-insurance experiment, it seems that those
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who are more trusting are more likely to respond to coverage upgrades than those
who are less trusting. These results are not robust to all measures of risk or all
types of randomisations in this paper, therefore should be taken with care. More-
over, trust is endogenous and likely to depend on both insurance choice and risk,
so these results are only suggestive in terms of understanding whether a particu-
lar channel through which trust may affect our results are central to baseline results.
Some suggestive evidence can also be provided to understand the moral hazard
results. In particular, it might be that I do not find any evidence of moral hazard
if accidents or claims are not capturing lack of effort/negligence with enough pre-
cision. Overall, I look at different vehicle risks and a priori it is hard to come up
with specific preventative activities that productively reduce probability of incur-
ring particular vehicle risks. One could argue that both third party and theft can be
reduced by parking the car in more secure locations or installing anti-theft system
or other types of systems. Since I can observe these behaviours from the survey
data, I run the moral hazard regressions taking as the dependent variable a dummy
for preventative care, instead of accidents. In fact, even for this alternative measure
of effort, individuals do not seem to display moral hazard, so that results (or lack
thereof) are not that likely to be driven by taking accidents as a measure of riskiness.
Also, the moral hazard result might be insignificant due to the significant pres-
ence of informal insurance in this market. In fact, in the survey, insurees reported
they have financed through informal means around 30% of accidents that were at
least partially covered with formal insurance; and around 50% of all accidents in
the past three years are financed through other drivers, friends and family. In such
a case, it might be that additional coverage by the company is only replacing infor-
mal insurance, and we then do not observe moral hazard. To check whether that
is the case, I examine whether upgrades in coverage reduce the amount of informal
financing for risks an individuals incurs. At least for third party coverage this seems
to be the case, while for upgrade in the co-insurance rate (from 10% to 0%) or up-
grade to theft coverage this channel does not seem to be central. I also show that
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the extent to which an individual had access to informal insurance seems to reduce
claims through the insurance company. Finally, it seems that those who had access
to informal insurance are not systematically different in their adverse selection test
statistic from those who did not have access to informal means to insure against
losses.
My research is related to a large empirical literature dedicated towards under-
standing the role of asymmetric information in explaining insurance market ineffi-
ciencies (for a comprehensive review, see Einav et al. 2010b). This work owes much
to the efforts of Chiappori & Salanie´ (1997), who describe a set of positive correla-
tion tests for asymmetric information. In competitive markets, a significant positive
correlation between coverage and ex-post risk, conditional on all information used
by the firm in pricing, would indicate presence of asymmetric information: either
consumers have prior information about their exposure to risk (adverse selection),
or insurees with higher coverage take less care (moral hazard), or both. In vehi-
cle insurance markets existing empirical results using this conditional correlation
approach are mixed: some find evidence of asymmetric information (Dahlby, 1983,
1992; Puelz & Snow, 1994; Richaudeau, 1999; Cohen, 2005; Kim et al, 2009), while
others do not (Chiappori & Salanie´, 2000; Dionne et al, 2001, 2004).
While positive correlation tests provide many valuable insights into the presence
of asymmetric information in many markets, as mentioned before, they do not al-
low for differentiation between adverse selection and moral hazard. Clearly, for a
researcher evaluating effectiveness of some policies, such as whether to make cover-
age more or less comprehensive, such distinction is necessary. On this, Abbring et
al. (2003) exploit panel data on insurance choices and claims to distinguish moral
hazard from dynamic selection on unobservables. Under moral hazard, experience
rating implies negative occurence dependence, since past claims increase the cost
of filing for an additional claim. With this methodology they find no evidence of
moral hazard. A second set of papers looks at experimental variation in “actual”
versus “self-selected” contracts, for instance Karlan & Zinman (2009) in consumer
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credit, Finkelstein et al. (2012) in health insurance, Gunnsteinsson (2014) in crop
insurance. Methodologically, I use an identification strategy which is very similar
to the one in Karlan and Zinman (2009), using the experiment to randomly create
a wedge between self-selected insurance contracts versus upgraded actual contracts.
The only difference is that while Karlan and Zinman (2009) use randomisation in
interest rates (or, prices) - which, in an insurance context, would imply that the
moral hazard test statistic could be due to an income effect - I use a randomisation
in the amount of coverage.
Finally, while there is a sizeable literature on tests and structural models of
asymmetric information in car insurance markets in developed countries (again, see
Chiappori and Salanie 2000; Dionne et al. 2001, 2006; Cohen 2005; Kim et al.
2009), there is very little evidence on relevance of asymmetric information in such
insurance markets in developing countries, and instead, most of the literature on in-
surance markets in developing countries focuses on crop insurance and catastrophic
risk insurance. However, life, property and health insurance, as mentioned above,
are important branches of insurance both for insurance providers (since they account
for a significant share of revenues) and individuals in such countries (since they ac-
count for frequent and relevant risks faced by them). This paper hopes to contribute
to this literature by, first of all, showing evidence on how car insurance markets op-
erate in one developing country, and showing suggestive evidence on which factors
peculiar to developing countries could be making the results distinguishable from
their counterparts in developed countries. Secondly, this paper does so using a ran-
domised experiment, while not altering the setting, i.e. how the firm operates, how
consumers choose between products, and their interactions, which provides an inter-
esting background within which to study issues related to asymmetric information.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the institutional
background with an emphasis on the informational environment at the firm and the
market level and how these features might potentially affect experimental design,
interpretation of the results and the external validity. Section III presents experi-
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mental design, its implementation, followed by detailed description of administrative
and survey data. Here I also discuss the identification strategy. Section IV shows
empirical results. Section V presents further robustness checks and discusses the
results against the features discussed in Section II. Section VI concludes.
II Context and menu design
I collaborated with the largest insurance firm in Mongolia to implement a ran-
domised experiment on its first-party car insurance product, which only insures
against losses to the policyholder’s vehicle and therefore excludes third party liabil-
ity cover. In particular, a typical insurance contract is characterised by a combina-
tion of vehicle risks (collision, third party, theft among others), a co-insurance rate
and a premium, while the firm set the deductibles at zero for all coverages.
I first present background information relevant to the research design and inter-
pretation of the results. In particular, I briefly discuss the market overview, followed
by different distribution channels through which car insurance is sold in Mongolia.
I then move on to describing technological and human capital constraints many
insurance providers face in Mongolia, preventing costless information sharing and
data collection within and between firms, which is often necessary for actuaries to
price optimally the insurance products, with the implication that multi-dimensional
screening tools often available for insurance providers in rich economies, such as
experience rating and reliable longitudinal data needed to price heavy-tailed or rare
risks, are not employed at all by insurance providers in Mongolia. Finally, I present
the experimental car insurance (product) design.
A Market overview and sales channels
Formal insurance is a relatively new concept in Mongolia, with the only insurance
company at the time, Mongol Daatgal, LLC., being privatised in 2003. Despite a
large growth in insurance markets (as well as the range of insurance products offered)
since then, even in the capital of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, car insurance markets are
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relatively small with only an estimated 10% of vehicles insured in 20114. Still, car
insurance is seen as the most popular private insurance by policymakers and insur-
ance providers, with the latter earning most of the revenue through car insurance
sales. It should be noted that the experiment was implemented a little less than
a year after third party liability (TPL) insurance, which is separate from the car
insurance product I consider, became compulsory for all drivers in Mongolia in 2012.
I collaborated with Mongol Daatgal, LLC. (MD from now on), the largest insur-
ance company in Mongolia, earning more than 30% of the market revenue for car
insurance since its inception. While the randomisation was implemented in Ulaan-
baatar, where 16 other insurance companies operate to sell car insurance along other
insurance lines, the market does not seem to be perfectly competitive. For instance,
at least for car insurance, the same five insurance companies have been consistently
earning around 80% of the total revenue in the period 2009-20125. At the time of
the experiment, pricing and further information about insurance products were not
readily available online, and often buyers had to visit the branches to find out such
information. Finally, among the participants of the survey that I discuss later on,
only around 30% report of having compared the product to those from alternative
providers.
By law an insurance policy only begins after the buyer physically signs the con-
tract, with the implication that insurance cannot be sold online and therefore all
contracts are paper-based. There are three different suppliers of insurance, often
operating in entirely different markets: 1) branch managers and agents, 2) brokers,
and 3) banks. Branch managers sell insurance at the different branches across the
country and receive a fixed salary with a bonus of 1.8% on all generated income,
while agents often sell off-site, for instance at gas stations, fairs, vehicle registration
offices et cetera. They have no salary and receive a bonus of 15% on generated
4Source: 2011 report by the Financial Regulatory Commission of Mongolia; www.frc.mn. The
statistics were published just before Third-Party Liability (TPL) insurance became compulsory for
all drivers, with the relevant law enforcement commencing in 2012.
5The statistics on yearly revenues at the firm level for different insurance types are also available
on www.frc.mn.
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income (see Appendix B for more details on sources of income for different branch
sellers). Since managers and agents often operated and were compensated differ-
ently, in turn we might expect the characteristics of insurees to differ depending on
who they bought the contract from. Furthermore, I implement the experiment only
at the branch level, excluding broker- and bank-sold contracts, as well as corporate
contracts. Below I discuss the reasons for focusing only on the branches.
In 2011 banks were permitted to sell car insurance, creating a “parallel” market
with the difference that bank insurees are also borrowers (insuring their collateral),
with rare cases of non-borrowers buying insurance through banks. Both banks and
brokers contract non-exclusively with insurance firms, so those who are buying in-
surance through banks or brokers typically face a larger choice set and lower prices
compared to branch-level insurees. Although most vehicle insurance contracts are
sold through banks (which we found out only at the end of the project due to lack
of reliable baseline data), at least for first-party vehicle insurance, I decided against
implementing the experiment with them for two reasons. Firstly, bank employees
are likely to direct insurees toward buying a particular (typically higher) coverage,
though this may not be as systematic, depending on bank-insurer agreements and
incentives for the bank employee in securing collateral, with the implication that
buyers do not necessarily self-select coverage based on their risk profile or prefer-
ences. Secondly, MD was not willing to design an identical insurance product for
banks in order to remain more competitive, so insurance product offered through
banks had a different design and was typically cheaper. Finally, with both banks
and brokers, there were concerns on the extent to which the randomisation process
would be correctly implemented and monitored reliably.
Table I.1 shows that these different types of contracts (with varying product de-
signs) typically attract different sets of buyers. In particular, the table shows average
revenue as well as the claim probability and average claim (in case of accident) for
each type of contract6. Bank insurees, typically the bank’s borrowers, have a much
6I focus here on all car insurance contracts sold in Ulaanbaatar during July 2013-July 2014, to
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lower claim probability compared to insurees in the experiment (branch-level)7. This
is suggestive evidence of presence of adverse selection in first-party car insurance,
given that branch-level insurees are likely to demand insurance on a voluntary basis,
while bank insurees are likely to be forced to buy insurance, therefore less likely to
self-select based on private information.
Finally, it can be seen from Table I.1 that the firm derives around 85% of the
profits (excluding non claim-related expenses) from corporate contracts8. Typically,
vehicles insured under such contracts are corporate-owned vehicles, and are often
more expensive and have multiple users. Since company drivers are often non-liable
for any damages, moral hazard is likely to be higher, while adverse selection is ex-
pected to be lower, for instance, if there are agency problems with the company
employee responsible for buying insurance not having the incentive or knowledge
of private information needed to buy suitable insurance coverage, if such private
information indeed exists.
These point to the possibility that there can be multiple insurance markets (with
very different set of consumers) even locally, for a given firm and a given insurance
product, with the implication that naturally empirical tests of asymmetric informa-
tion are almost always likely to be context-specific, and the interesting question is
then to understand whether we can learn more about the underlying market fea-
tures potentially driving the heterogeneous results, abundant in recent empirical
literature.
be consistent with the scope of the experiment. Also, brokers are not present there, as the firm
did not contract with any brokers during this period.
7It should be noted that claim probability for bank contracts is likely to be biased downwards
with the dataset used to construct Table I.1, because as can be seen from Table I.1 most bank
contracts were sold in May-June 2014, so for most contracts claims data are still being collected.
Restricting to the sample of contracts for which complete claims data are available, i.e. those that
were sold until March 2014, claim probabilities change to 0.38, 0.27 and 0.49 for corporate, bank
and experiment contracts, respectively. The reported pattern is similar.
8According to the firm, operational costs are relatively high, estimated to be around 20-40% of
the revenue for first-party car insurance, depending on the coverage type.
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B Firm’s information set and pricing
The firm has been using the same insurance software for at least a decade, which
fails to record data on most individual- and vehicle-specific characteristics, typically
used for insurance pricing, for instance, age, gender, vehicle type, engine size et
cetera9. The software only records where the contract was sold (branch), insurance
start and end date, car valuation and total premium paid. The firm claims that IT
constraints, in combination with constraints in hiring good programmers and actu-
aries, prevent system-wide data collection, monitoring and hence implementation of
pricing contingent on individual-level characteristics10.
Before the experiment the firm offered a very complicated design for its first-party
car insurance product, where the price could also be adjusted (to some extent) by
sellers. Since the insurance software did not record the amount of coverage for sold
contracts, for instance, types of risks covered, excess, deductible or co-insurance
rate, the firm’s actuary typically did not have such information at the pricing stage.
The actuary would then calculate market share and fit claims distribution for some
arbitrary car value intervals and a rough estimate of “amount of coverage” proxied
by the ratio of premium paid to car value, and used these to set the premium as
a percentage of car value for a given coverage level11. In particular, assuming per-
fectly inelastic demand (hence assuming no effect of prices on the risk pool), the
premium for each coverage was set to cover claims with 95% confidence level plus
some profit margin. For many other dimensions of the contract, such as deductibles
and co-insurance rates, the rate was set arbitrarily based on “experience” of the
claims department as well as competitors’ products. With this, it can be seen that
capacity to screen consumers is quite limited, or at least it is not straightforward to
infer the intention to screen from the firm’s pricing strategy prior to the experiment.
9The firm continued to use the same insurance software until the end of our experiment. In
2013 it started developing a new insurance program, which is still at development stage as of April
2015.
10As of 2009 there were no qualified actuaries in Mongolia from internationally recognised in-
stitutes, with only 9 actuaries permitted by the Financial Regulatory Commission of Mongolia to
practice actuarial science in the whole country. Actuarial or related courses only started in 2009.
11The firm tried to collect a sample of claims and contracts to check exact coverage and claim
type in 2012, but the sample was small and non-random.
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Besides aforementioned lack of contingent pricing, to the best of my knowledge,
MD did not employ experience rating for almost any type of insurance, including
first-party car insurance, since (i) claim history was only centralised for TPL insur-
ance in 2012, and (ii) the firm does not systematically record past claims for its own
insurees. As for other insurance providers, at the time of introducing the experiment
no firm had a bonus malus system12.
The constraints described above are also present to a large extent for other
insurance providers in Mongolia, and therefore have several important implications
at the market level. Firstly, incomplete, possibly even biased, data are used to price
insurance products, including the experimental car insurance product. Secondly,
prices reflect risk and demand only to the extent that car values explain risk and
demand. I show that for the experimental product, car value is positively correlated
with demand for higher coverage, but does not reflect significantly any of the risk
measures we use, such as number of claims or claim probability. From discussions
with sellers, they never refused insurance or priced based on risk factor(s) other than
car value and have had neither the financial incentive nor an explicit instruction
from the management to do so, further reinforcing the evidence towards lack of
risk-contingent pricing.
C Menu design
First-party vehicle insurance only covers damages to own (insured) vehicle. As men-
tioned in part B of this section, before the experiment the firm offered a complicated
product design with some flexibility for sellers to adjust prices. Moreover, also prior
to the experiment MD had been separately working on a new design, with an aim
to simplify the design (claiming this is likely to attract those who have little expe-
rience with formal insurance), and we keep this new design for the experiment (see
Figure II.1).
12Some type of bonus malus scheme, not in its usual sense, exists at MD. See Appendix C for
more details.
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I provide here the firm’s definition of each risk label in the experimental product
design. Although all labels and definitions were literally translated from Mongo-
lian, the meanings are kept. “Vehicle-related accident” is any loss to the insured
vehicle caused by an unintentional action or inaction of the policyholder, other non-
excluded drivers or a third party. Typical examples are collision, hitting a garage
post and being hit by a stone, a more likely risk near construction sites or on dirt
roads. “Natural disaster” includes any other acts of God, such as thunder and
hail. “Third-party intentional action” is any loss to the insured vehicle intentionally
caused by a third party without the policyholders’ or other non-excluded drivers’
permission, for instance, when a vehicle is scratched or drawn on, hit-and-run et
cetera. Initially, the firm intended to create an insurance line against common risks,
for which subrogation is unlikely, and ended up classifying it as “Third-party inten-
tional action”13. Therefore, at least to some extent, the product design can reflect
the likelihood of recovering losses. Meanwhile, drivers’ personal accident insurance
pays out up to 5 million Mongolian Tugriks (MNT), or around £1667, for 70% or
higher loss of employability or death, as a result of a car accident. There is a separate
personal accident cover offered by the firm, with options to increase protection level.
Figure II.1 describes the different plans available in the experimental product de-
sign (for simplicity I only provided labels of the most common risks). In particular,
the most basic coverage covers against both “Vehicle-related accident” and “Natural
disaster”, while middle coverage covers additionally against “Third party intentional
damage” and “Water leakage in the garage”. The highest coverage is comprehen-
sive, additionally covering against “Theft/robbery”, “Fire/explosion” and “Driver’s
personal accident”. Since insurees only ended up claiming in collision, third party
and theft, labels in the figure reflect this, for simplicity. Amount of coverage is
therefore determined by a bundle of risks and a co-insurance rate (also on the prod-
uct design), which is the fraction of losses financed by the insuree. Premium rate is
13Subrogation allows the firm to attempt to recover costs from the faulty party. This cannot be
done, for instance, if the faulty party cannot be traced (hit-and-run accident).
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 Car	  risks	   Low	   Middle	   High	  
Risk	  1	  (collision	  etc.)	   √	   √	   √	  
Risk	  2	  (third	  party	  etc.)	  
	  
√	   √	  
Risk	  3	  (theft	  etc.)	  
	   	  
√	  
PRICING	  
Premium	  (%	  of	  vehicle	  value)	   0.8%	   1.2%	   2.0%	   3.0%	   3.8%	  
Co-­‐insurance	  rate	   10%	   10%	   0%	   10%	   0%	  
Figure II.1: Experimental car insurance product design
expressed as a percentage of car value, therefore final price depends on both the car
value and the amount of coverage. To illustrate, for instance, product 1 covers 90%
of the losses due to “Vehicle-related accident” and “Natural disaster” at a premium
of 0.8% of the car value. Finally, I do not allow sellers to flexibly set prices during




Low (10%) Middle (10%)
Middle (10%)
Middle (10%) Middle (0%) High (10%)






Figure II.2: This figure shows initial selection by buyers into different coverages (red lines), followed by the randomisation assigning some buyers
to the same coverage or a higher coverage (blue lines). The numbers along the lines indicate number of contracts sold.
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III Methodology
A Experimental design and implementation
In order to identify adverse selection and moral hazard separately, we offer insurance
against an additional source of risk to randomly selected buyers, at no additional
cost. In this way, we implemented three types of randomisations. A random subset
of buyers who self-selected into “Low” coverage are assigned to “Middle” coverage,
keeping the same level of co-insurance rate (10%). Similarly, a random subset of
buyers, who self-selected into “Middle” coverage, are upgraded to “High” coverage,
again keeping the co-insurance rate constant (10%). Finally, “Middle” coverage in-
surees with 10% co-insurance rate are upgraded to the same type of coverage but
without co-insurance rate. The choices and subsequent assignments are shown in
Figure II.2.
The experiment was implemented at MD for exactly one year (07/2013-07/2014).
The randomisation was implemented at all seven branches of the firm in Ulaan-
baatar, employing 51 insurance managers and 12 active agents. The last experi-
mental contract was sold in July 2014, so claims are still being tracked for some
contracts. Therefore, in all regressions I use 11 months’ worth of claims data for
each one-year contract on average. Early cancellations are allowed only if there had
been no claims, and to the best of my knowledge, almost all buyers bought one-year
insurance and have not cancelled before the contract ended, with the implication
that we do not need to control for length of the contract, but length of time for
which the contract is valid until the claims data is collected14.
Since all contracts have to be paper-based and monitoring is costly, especially
for agents who sell outside the branches, there were concerns that sellers might try
to find out the randomisation outcome before finalising the contract. For example,
14The financial department is responsible for the cancellations. In future, it might be possible
to check this more closely by merging data sets from the financial and sales departments. Due
to some non-unique contract “identifiers” and lack of description against transactions, the merged
data may still be inaccurate.
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if sellers can easily find out which contracts could be upgraded for free and sell
them to friends or family, who might be riskier, then detection of adverse selection
and moral hazard can be driven by sellers’ fraud, instead of underlying asymmetric
information. To better monitor sellers and therefore reduce the extent to which
this can happen, the randomisation was implemented through a mobile messaging
software, with sellers and buyers sending messages to the server to find out the
randomisation outcome (with some specific information about the contract). In
this way I can see if sellers found out the randomisation outcome before sales went
through, by for example, merging with the transactions data. Also, it is easy to
check if a buyer (or another seller) is colluding with the seller by sending messages
on multiple contracts. I complemented the program with multiple training sessions
and a seller’s manual on how to finalise contracts with the interactive software in
place (see Appendix E for an outline of the instructions sent out to the sellers).
B Data description
To better monitor the process, the company sent out 2565 bills - company papers
on which contracts can be written - to the branches and at the end of July 2014 I
managed to track and physically recover almost all of the bills15. 1434 were valid
contracts, the rest were either invalidated or unused. For the invalidated and unused
bills only 39 mobile messages were sent out, so the extent to which sellers attempted
to find out the randomisation outcome before the contract is finalised is likely to
be low. The messaging scheme also allowed me to detect 35 contracts suspected of
biasing the randomisation, so these were eliminated from all regressions, though for
almost all regressions coefficient estimates do not change significantly, once they are
included16.
15As mentioned before, all contracts have to be paper-based. Branches request a certain number
of bills and they distribute the bills according to an ordered numeric bill identifier. I needed to
track all bills to include contracts for which messages were not sent, in case there were any. The
fact that 1) within the branch distribution of bills is random, 2) the firm’s insurance software does
not track the bills and 3) difficulties in enforcing data entry, quality of which can be monitored,
made this process very challenging.
1635 contracts with one or combination of following features: 1) messages were sent at least one
day before the contract has started, 2) the randomisation was incorrectly done, and 3) success-
ful upgrades after unsuccessful attempts discovered for some of the above 39 invalid or unused
contracts.
28
I present summary statistics by chosen coverage in Table III.1. Balance tables
to check the validity of the randomisation are presented in Appendix VI. Variables
used in these tables are contract-specific variables: insuree gender, age (in years)
and residence dummies; vehicle age (in years), value (in Mongolian Tugriks MNT)17,
brand dummies, a dummy for whether vehicle is of a lighter colour. I also collected
seller-specific characteristics - gender, age, length of employment at MD, a dummy
for whether the seller is an agent or a manager - as well as when the contract
started, the number of days that the contract has been valid. Table VI.1 shows
the differences between those who chose the lowest coverage and were assigned to
middle coverage (at 10% co-insurance rate) versus those who were kept in the lowest
coverage. Similarly, Table VI.2 presents the relevant results for those who chose
middle coverage and were assigned to the highest coverage (at 10% co-insurance
rate) versus those who were kept in middle coverage. Finally, Table VI.3 shows
the relevant results for the co-insurance experiment. Overall, on 18 out of 21 pre-
randomisation outcomes there is no significant difference between those who were
upgraded to a higher coverage versus those who were kept in low coverage. Outcomes
on “Days insured” and whether seller is an agent or manager, seller agent, enter
significantly in two of the three balance tables. In particular, it seems contracts
with upgrades were more likely to be sold earlier on in the project by managers,
compared to contracts without upgrades. This can be fully explained by distribution
of bills, which is random across sellers and branches. In particular, sales are seasonal,
with more sales earlier on in the project, and branches with high volume sales (and
managers rather than agents) ended up being (randomly) allocated more contracts
with upgrades.
1 Administrative data
Administrative data include around 1434 valid contracts matched with 616 claims
materials. Contracts have a standard format, while claims materials do not, rang-
ing from five to forty pages, so we identified common documents, such as insurance
171 GBP ≈ 3000 MNT according to www.mongolbank.mn as of February 2015.
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hotline reports, claims application forms and claims department reports. For incom-
plete claims materials I filled in the gaps using police reports and discussions with
claims managers and hotline employees.
All contracts and claims materials are handwritten, and since the company did
not record most of the data, I took photos and manually entered the data18. In ad-
dition to the variables used to construct the balance tables, I also collected data on
the amount of coverage - risks covered and co-insurance rate - as well as whether sig-
nature of the buyer and the seller were present and whether the upgrade information
was correctly entered on the contract. From the claims materials I collected a vast
set of variables, including accident type, car value at the time of the accident, claim
size, payout, evaluator dummies. Finally, I collected seller-specific characteristics
from human resources records at MD.
2 Survey data
At the end of sales, during August-September 2014, I hired six enumerators to
contact by phone all insurees, whose contracts indicated residence in Ulaanbaatar
and who were not foreigners, to participate in a survey aimed at understanding
insurance markets in Mongolia19. Enumerators were not given in advance any infor-
mation about the insuree, except full name, telephone number and home address.
Few measures were taken to achieve a high response rate and to reduce the extent
to which respondents hid their risky behaviour. At the same time it was important
to explain how we obtained their personal information. In our initial calls we in-
formed the interviewees that their contact information was shared by MD as part of
a collaborative work to evaluate and improve car insurance market inefficiencies in
Ulaanbaatar and while participation is voluntary, this research can be important for
policy analysis. They were told that we could meet them wherever and whenever is
18Quality of data entry was checked by comparing entered data on some of the variables against
administrative data from firm’s insurance and claims programs. I also checked a random sample
of the entered data against the original contracts, and during these checks no entry errors were
found.
1943 insurees stated on the contract their residence is outside of Ulaanbaatar and 25 were not
Mongolian.
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convenient for them and that the interview is expected to take around 30 minutes.
Finally, we told them that interviews were part of a larger research, funded exter-
nally and undertaken by an independent researcher, and data obtained during the
interviews will not be shared with third parties, including MD, and will not be used
outside the scope of this research. In the end, we interviewed 553 insurees.
To ensure quality and monitor enumerators, the interviews were conducted us-
ing tablets and audio recorded. Before the interview started, enumerators were
instructed to read information on the broad research purpose, while addressing pri-
vacy concerns, and to ask participants again for their permission to be interviewed.
Once we managed to meet the respondent, there was only one case in which the
respondent refused to continue with the survey, in all other cases the interviews
were completed within one meeting20. As for the extent to which risky behaviour
was captured by the interviews, a total of around 1200 accidents and detailed infor-
mation about these accidents were recorded as part of a three-year accident history.
Most respondents seemed unconcerned to share such information, and the number
of reported accidents suggest that revealing this information did not seem to be a
major issue.
The interviewers each ran on average four interviews a day, lasting 45 minutes on
average, with the time in between spent repeatedly contacting insurees to schedule
interviews21. For 21 contracts we interviewed a household member, instead of the
insuree. Out of the 21 contracts, 20 drove the insured vehicle and 16 bought the
experimental car insurance together with the insuree, with the implication that we
can be confident of having interviewed the right person and even if this was not the
20Sometimes it proved hard to track the potential interviewee even after obtaining their permis-
sion on the phone. Often when enumerators got to the place of meeting, respondents’ phones were
turned off. We did not take any systematic measures to reduce the incidence of this, except try to
confirm the meeting few hours prior to the interview and often ended up showing up at the agreed
location, without such confirmation.
21Many interviews ended up lasting longer than expected. This is mostly due to respondents
reporting a higher number of accidents than we expected, resulting in interviews taking longer
to record all the details for each accident. Also, other factors could have contributed. We often
met the respondents at their work place, rather than at their homes, where they could be more
distracted. More careful respondents often took longer time to respond to detailed questions.
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case, the respondent was in a position to answer most of the interview questions.
However, it should be noted that even when we interviewed the right person, we
realised that sometimes the respondent was not the main driver or even a driver for
the insured vehicle (there was only one such case), with the implication that an-
swers to some questions on driving behaviour or vehicle usage present an incomplete
picture about true vehicle usage, which could have entered as an important factor
in purchasing insurance. With this, we should, to the best of our ability, incorpo-
rate information about other drivers of the vehicle (from the survey) as well as the
insuree. Finally, in 65 cases, the respondents gave information on a different vehi-
cle than the one that they insured with MD, so in these cases some vehicle-related
variables are recorded as missing.
Some insurees had more than one vehicle insured, so the total number of con-
tracts for respondents is 574, a response rate of around 42%. Insurees from 340
contracts refused to participate in the survey, primarily due to time constraints. For
the remaining 452 contracts, I was either unable to reach the insuree or they could
not participate within the survey time frame. Table VII.1 is the balance table for
respondents versus non-respondents.
We compare survey respondents versus non-respondents on a number of char-
acteristics, including 1) the treatment variable “Upgrade”, taking value 1 if insuree
is upgraded to a higher coverage and 0 otherwise, 2) riskiness, overall and by risk
type, and 3) a range of characteristics collected from the administrative data. Since
the respondents make up a non-random sample of all insurees in the experiment,
we might be concerned that results for survey respondents are not applicable to
other insurees. For instance, if predominantly low risk (or low income or those who
were upgraded in the experiment) individuals agreed to participate in the survey,
adverse selection and moral hazard results are likely to be biased. From the tables
we see that there is a good balance on almost all outcomes, treatment and controls
likely to be correlated with risky behaviour, suggesting bias of the estimates is likely
to be small. Moreover, regressions to identify adverse selection and moral hazard
32
ran for all insurees and for only survey respondents yield similar estimates, even in
magnitude22.
The two variables that enter significantly in the balance tables are insuree age
and car value (also see density plots in Figure VII.1). Younger insurees or those
with high car values (likely wealthier) are less likely to participate in the survey.
Differences among respondents and non-respondents in car value can be shown to
be entirely driven by extreme high values, with the significance disappearing when
the top 1% of car values are eliminated from the analysis (see Table VII.2). On
the other hand, age explains claim probability (one measure of riskiness I use) to
some extent, though for age alone R2 is very low at around 0.013, and the sig-
nificant difference among respondents versus non-respondents is not explained by
extreme values. Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which compares the median age assuming
distribution shapes are identical, also yield significant results. However, if I use
the Harrell-Davis estimator in conjunction with a percentile bootstrap, proposed
by Wilcox et al. (2014), to compare quantiles of age distributions, all tests reject
significant differences across quantiles, though at all quantiles age of respondents
is higher than that of non-respondents. The results of this are presented in Fig-
ure VII.2 and Table VII.323. In summary, overall, survey respondents are older than
non-respondents, however, we fail to see significant differences across almost all out-
come, treatment and a range of controls, so bias in estimates from using the survey
data are expected to be small.
The survey collects detailed information about individual’s riskiness, risky be-
haviour and attitudes toward risk, including but not limited to driving experience,
where they park their cars, whether they have anti-theft system, 3-year history of
accidents and detailed information about them (both claimed and unclaimed), pur-
22Not all results are displayed here, and additional information can be requested.
23The column labeled p.value shows the p-value for a single quantile bootstrapping test. As we
do multiple tests (one for each quantile), the overall Type 1 error (defaulting to .05) is controlled
by the Hochberg method. Therefore, for each p-value a critical p-value is calculated (see column
labeled p crit). The column signif marks all tests which fulfill this condition and as discussed, all
tests reject significant differences.
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chase of other types of insurance, evaluation of own driving skills, evaluation of
different types of risky driving behaviour and risk aversion. In particular, to elicit
risk aversion, we asked insurees to consider a (hypothetical) binary lottery choice
between a safe option yielding a certain amount and a risky option, in a sequence
each time increasing the safe option by a certain amount. Alternatively, we could
proxy for risk aversion, using other types of risky behaviour, such as smoking, busi-
ness ownership, whether they bought other types of insurance in the past, seat belt
usage and consumption/saving behaviour. In addition to the above, we also recorded
characteristics not captured in the contracts, such as education, property ownership,
employment, income, vehicle usage and whether there are other drivers. Finally, we
wanted to capture the extent to which insurees distrust formal insurance, by asking
them directly about trust, but also indirectly on whether they would recommend
formal insurance to friends/family, whether they had any conflicts in the past with
insurance companies, whether they got less than what they claimed for et cetera.
Firstly, these variables are necessary for moral hazard test and secondly, they could
be used to check whether estimates are heterogeneous across different insurees and
ultimately try to understand the underlying forces driving this heterogeneity. Means
of most characteristics are presented in Table V.1.
Finally, in addition to insuree interviews, in November 2014 I collaborated with
the marketing department at the firm to survey each seller and record for each
contract the extent to which he/she knew the insuree. We explained to the sellers
that the purpose of the survey was to understand the firm’s outreach into new
markets. Through this I found out that for around 27% of contracts sellers knew the
person they sold insurance to. This can be used to understand whether there was any
preferential ex-ante or ex-post treatment for friends, which provides an interesting
margin for interpretation of adverse selection and moral hazard estimates.
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C Identification strategy
1 Adverse selection test
In a context of insurance with adverse selection, we would expect that individuals
who choose higher insurance coverages are also riskier. However, choosing higher
insurance coverages also means, often, getting higher insurance coverage and facing
different incentives to exert effort.
In order to isolate adverse selection, choices of insurance coverage correlate with
risk, from moral hazard - the direct effect of coverage over riskiness, we compare
claims behaviour of high coverage buyers versus low coverage upgraded buyers, for
a sample of individuals who, after the randomisation, end up with the same (high)
coverage. Given that these individuals’ final coverage is the same, any difference in
riskiness across these two groups of individuals is driven by their different incentives
to self-select into different products.
More precisely, for each risk R ∈ {“TP”, “Theft”}, we run the following regres-
sion:
Riski,R = αi,R + β0RLow coverage choicei + γRXi + i,R (1)
on the sample of individuals i who ended up in the same contract covering R. In
this regression, Riski,R is an individual i’s proxy of riskiness in risk type R (different
proxies are discussed in the next section), Low coverage choice is a dummy indicat-
ing that individual i chose not to be covered for risk i (or chose higher co-insurance
rates, depending on the experiment analysed), and Xi is a set of controls, either from
the administrative data, or from combining both the administrative data and the
survey data. To test for the presence of adverse selection we are interested in testing
whether β0R < 0: if this is the case, individuals who chose not to be covered for risk
R but ended up covered for risk R are less risky than individuals who chose to be
covered for risk R and remained covered for this risk. Crucially, since the sample
used in this regression is just the sample of individuals who have coverage for risk
R (or who have a lower co-insurance rate), we know that individuals’ incentives are
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being held fixed, and that if β0R < 0, this must be because the individual’s riskiness
correlates with the way he self-selects into different amounts of coverage.
It is useful to further discuss what types of patterns could create β0R 6= 0: cru-
cially, β0R < 0 if the individual is privately informed about his inherent riskiness,
and this affects the way he chooses insurance products. Secondly, if other factors
affecting coverage choice - say, the individual’s risk aversion - are correlated with
the individual’s inherent riskiness, this will also be reflected in β0R. Thirdly, if dif-
ferent individuals respond differently to insurance coverage (that is, if the extent of
moral hazard is heterogeneous), and if they anticipate their responses to insurance
coverages at the moment of coverage choice (what has been dubbed “selection on
moral hazard”, see Einav et al. 2013), this might display itself as a non-zero β0R.
Finally, given that the experimental procedure can only randomly upgrade coverages
without increases in premium rates, the coefficient β0R captures differences in risk
between individuals who have same coverages, but pay different premiums. If the
premium level affects effort provision and accident prevention through an income
effect (that is, differences in the premium might affect effort provision by changing
risk aversion and hence changing the marginal disutility from a loss), this will be
captured in this adverse selection coefficient. It should be noted, however, that we
do not expect this effect to be significant: first, the differences in premium payments
across products are not large relative to the individual’s income, which suggests the
variation in marginal utility and risk aversion due to premium changes should not be
too large for this experiment.24 Secondly, given that we do not capture significant
levels of moral hazard for overall accidents, it is unlikely that there are significant
differences in effort due to differences in premium levels.
In other words, β0R will capture, in reduced form, whether there are any factors
24Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that if individuals who self-selected in low coverage
were to choose higher coverage, the premium difference would be around 0.3-1.7% of their reported
yearly income, depending on which coverage they self-selected into. Here I have only considered
the possible high coverages due to the randomisation. Only for upgrade to theft coverage, the
premium difference goes above 1% of the salary, which the implication that overall income effects
are likely to be small.
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driving choices of coverage levels that are correlated with riskiness, given individuals’
incentives to exert effort to reduce risks is held constant. This is the usual force we
are interested in to understand whether adverse selection has the potential to create
market failures: namely, whether individuals’ incentives to self-select into different
products increase the insurance company’s costs of providing insurance coverage
(see Chiappori et al. 2006, who dub this “relevant asymmetric information”, and
Finkelstein & Poterba 2004).
Two other issues are worth discussing on this test of adverse selection: firstly,
what would happen to this test if individuals anticipated that the randomisation
will take place? If individuals do not anticipate the outcome of the randomisation
- as the implementation section suggests, a significant amount of effort was spent
on guaranteeing this is the case - individuals might be more prone to selecting low
coverages if they anticipate that randomisation will happen, with the hope that their
coverages will be upgraded. Notice, however, that qualitatively, at the moment of
insurance choice, this is equivalent to selling two products: a low coverage product,
that covers a risk with some probability lower than 1, and a high coverage product
that covers the risk with certainty. This should make the low coverage product
more similar to the high coverage product and reduce the power of this experiment
to detect adverse selection. Hence, the possibility that individuals are anticipating
that the randomisation will happen should, if anything, act to attenuate the results
on adverse selection, and push us towards viewing this test as a lower bound on the
correlation between insurance choices and riskiness.
Secondly, at first, the results from this test could be due to the relative absence
of contingent pricing: in particular, without contingent pricing, it could be that
individuals who are riskier along dimensions which are observable to the firm can
afford to self-select into a higher coverage; the correlation might weaken if the firm
employed contingent pricing thereby charging a higher price for riskier individuals.
This would not be adverse selection in its usual sense, since if this was the only force
driving the results, there would be no market failure, and all we would need to do
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is to force the firm to engage in “better” pricing. I discuss this possibility in more
detail in section VI.
2 Moral hazard test
Similarly, in the context of an insurance market in which there is moral hazard, we
should expect that higher insurance coverage for a given individual should reduce
the incentives of an individual to exert effort, and as a consequence, would increase
the individual’s riskiness. Despite this, individuals with lower insurance coverage
typically have chosen lower insurance coverage, in the sense that a correlation be-
tween insurance coverage and risk could be driven by selection effects.
Again, I use the experimental design to distinguish between the moral hazard
story and the adverse selection story. More precisely, I compare the riskiness of
individuals who were randomly selected to receive an upgrade in coverage with
the riskiness of individuals who were not granted this upgrade, in a sample of
individuals who self-selected into a lower coverage. More precisely, for each risk
R ∈ {“TP”, “Theft”}, I run the following regression:
Riski,R = α˜i,R + β˜0RUpgradei + γ˜RXi + ˜i,R (2)
on the sample of individuals i who self-selected in the same coverage, that did not
cover for risk R. Again, Riski,R and Xi are the same as in the regression identifying
adverse selection, and Upgradei is a dummy that takes a value of 1 whenever indi-
vidual i, who self-selected into no-coverage for risk R (or a higher co-insurance rate),
became covered for risk R due to the randomisation. Given that this regression is
estimated on a sample of individuals who self-selected into the same product but
ended up in different products, by testing for β˜0,R > 0, I am testing for whether
random upgrades in coverage have a causal impact over riskiness - that is, by testing
for β˜0R > 0, I am testing for the presence of ex-post moral hazard.
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We might over-estimate moral hazard if we only focus on claims data, as those
who were kept in lower coverage can still incur accidents while not having the right
to claim losses through insurance. Hence, by focusing on only claims data, we will
trivially find “moral hazard”, since we’ll observe zero accidents for uncovered indi-
viduals and positive accidents for covered individuals. Yet, this is not the statistic of
interest to discuss moral hazard, since moral hazard actually refers to the impact of
insurance coverage over the individual’s expected accidents that would be claimed
if they were covered. That is, to test for moral hazard, we would like to have a risk
measure that captures accidents that would be claimed if the individual was covered.
To do this, I run the regressions for moral hazard only on survey respondents,
for whom I observe both claimed and unclaimed accidents (and in particular, this is
the sample for which I can at least observe the accidents faced by uncovered individ-
uals). I then first consider a measure RiskiR that sums both claimed and unclaimed
risks. This might include both risks that the individual would claim, and risks that
would never be claimed. To take this possibility into account, I then consider a
new measure of Riski,R that sums claimed and unclaimed accidents, but excludes
accidents for which losses are reported by the individual as too small to claim or
accidents having a zero loss size25.
It is useful to discuss what types of economic forces could drive β˜0R 6= 0: firstly,
if individuals react to insurance coverages by putting in less effort into accident
prevention (ex-ante moral hazard), this should translate into β0R > 0. Secondly, if
individuals who have a higher coverage commit fraud more or less often, or if they
claim more often than less covered individuals (ex-post moral hazard), this should
translate into β0R 6= 0. Finally, the coefficient β˜0R will capture the average impact
of higher coverage over riskiness for individuals self-selecting into low coverage.
25Alternatively I can use additional information collected on knowledge about own coverage and
eliminate accidents which the consumer believes to covered against but still decide to not claim.
Since almost half of low coverage consumers believed they are covered with higher coverage, most
unclaimed accidents would be eliminated from this analysis. Results do not change significantly
with this exercise.
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With this, enough has been established to move to the empirical results.
IV Empirical results
Tests for adverse selection and moral hazard for the three experiments are presented
in Appendix IV. I use three measures of riskiness, generically termed as accident
frequency, dummy and loss size. To test for adverse selection I use only claims data,
except for theft, for which I also use three-year history of accidents, while for moral
hazard I use all accidents (during the contract) with positive losses26.
In particular, for accident frequency (dummy), I run a Poisson (logit) regression
and average partial effects are presented using “mfx” package in R27. For loss size,
I use log(Loss size + 1) due to a mass at zero and perform least squares regression
with robust standard errors28. Finally, if sample size is very small (around 100 or
less), I also conduct exact Poisson and logistic regression estimates and standard
errors, used often for small sample analysis, as well as usual Poisson and logistic
regressions with bootstrapped standard errors29.
A Adverse selection
Table VIII.1 presents adverse selection results for third party risk using claims dur-
ing the experiment as the dependent variable. The point estimates in the first row
are all negative and statistically significant. When all controls are accounted for, the
26If we expect long-run incidence to be a more accurate representation of risk type, we could
just run the adverse selection regressions using three-year history of accidents. Given that past
accident frequency are highly correlated with accidents during the contract the results are similar.
The downside of doing this is that we are only focusing on survey respondents and we do not
have administrative data on their past contracts, hence cannot take into account moral hazard,
defeating the intention to distinguish how individuals self-select in different contracts based on
their riskiness from moral hazard.
27Using Vuong’s non-nested hypothesis test, negative binomial distribution is a better fit for
accident frequency than poisson distribution (without any additional controls). However, if we
include the controls typically included in all regressions, this advantage fully disappears.
28Alternatively, we can use either compound Poisson-gamma distribution with a positive mass
at zero, often employed in the insurance literature to predict claims, or zero-inflated models,
however, these should be avoided with small samples. Another possibility is to estimate accident
frequency and loss size independently, however sample size of positive losses is too small for credible
estimation.
29Results are not reported here, but the estimates are almost exactly the same as with Poisson
or logit regressions.
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point estimates are slightly higher, while precision remains about the same. These
suggest that keeping ex-post moral hazard constant, individuals who self-selected
into the lowest coverage are significantly less risky in third party risk than indi-
viduals who self-selected into the middle coverage. For insurees choosing middle
coverage, average third party claim frequency and probability are 0.175 and 0.156,
respectively. Then, columns 1-4 show that those who chose low coverage are at
least 50% less likely to have a third party accident than those who chose middle
coverage. Columns 5-6 show that those who chose lower coverage yield at least 85%
lower costs than those who chose higher coverage30. These estimates are in magni-
tude very large, with the implication that adverse selection is both economically and
statistically significant. Similar results hold for 3-year third party accident history,
reinforcing the evidence for individuals self-selecting into different coverages based
on somewhat persistent private information, even if initially we may be doubtful
about the presence of private information on third party accidents.
For theft, firstly, Table VIII.2 presents adverse selection results for theft using
only claims as the dependent variable. The coefficients on Low coverage choice in
the first row are positive - and statistically significant in 4 out of 6 regressions -
suggesting advantageous selection. Those who chose the highest coverage did not
make any claims against theft, while those who chose the middle coverage had only
five theft claims, suggesting that it is hard to capture individuals’ riskiness in theft
with only claims data. To account for this, I run the same regressions only on
survey respondents, changing the dependent variable to three-year history of theft
accidents. If the coefficients on Low coverage choice are negative and significant,
then this would be evidence of adverse selection with those who faced higher theft
risk over a longer period in the past being more likely to choose coverage against it.
The results are presented in Table VIII.3. Average theft frequency and probability
for those who self-selected into the higher coverage are 0.342 and 0.263, respectively.
30We run a gamma regression of claim size on the sample of insurees who have claimed at least
once (a total of 89 claims). While low coverage insurees claim lower amount it is not significant,
suggesting that adverse selection results are driven by claim frequency, rather than how much is
claimed. From the firm’s perspective, this still translates into lower expected costs for low coverage
versus middle coverage buyers.
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The point estimates suggest that those who self-selected into lower coverage have
at least 50% lower probability of theft risk than those who self-selected into higher
coverage, at least in the long run. The adverse selection results above, as with third
party risk, are both quantitatively and statistically important. These results firstly
suggest that especially for a rare event, such as theft, we may only be able to cap-
ture adverse selection if we have data on long-run history of theft risks. Secondly,
adverse selection is at least partially driven by unclaimed accidents, which are a lot
harder to capture without survey data31.
On the other hand, we do not find any evidence of adverse selection for higher
versus lower co-insurance rate (see Table VIII.4). For the regression, I use claims
in both collision and third party as the dependent variable, since all insurees in the
sample are covered against both risks but only differ in the extent of risk sharing,
the co-insurance rate32. None of the point estimates in the first row are significant
and the results are robust to including controls. This implies that those who chose
insurance with no co-insurance rate are not riskier than those who self-selected in
insurance with 10% co-insurance rate.
B Moral hazard
I now move on to moral hazard results. Tables VIII.5- VIII.8 present moral hazard
results for third party and theft. To reiterate we have to use all accidents during the
contract to test for whether higher coverage incentivises insurees to be more negli-
gent. Tables VIII.5 and VIII.7 therefore use all accidents as the dependent variable.
The coefficient on Upgrade is not significantly different from 0 and do not change
with adding controls, implying no evidence of moral hazard, at least for low cover-
age insurees. However, the more relevant test for moral hazard, at least from the
firm’s perspective, might be to include only accidents which are likely to be claimed
31To account for smaller sample size I also looked at average partial effects with bootstrapped
standard errors and exact Poisson/logistic regression estimates. The results are robust to these
adjustments.
32Using separately claims for each risk yields similar results. In other words, we do not find any
evidence of adverse selection for the co-insurance rate experiment for either risk.
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by the insuree. In other words, the usual moral hazard test could be rejected if
low coverage insurees who were not upgraded reported as many accidents as those
who were upgraded, while actual moral hazard could be high if they are also more
likely to have “negligible” losses. Yet excluding accidents that were reported to have
“negligible” or zero losses yields similar results (see Tables VIII.6 and VIII.8).
Finally, Table VIII.9 presents moral hazard results for the co-insurance experi-
ment. Since all insurees in the sample are allowed to claim for both collision and
third party, claims in both can be used to capture moral hazard33. The point esti-
mates in the first row on Upgrade are not significantly different from zero (they in
fact reduce in absolute value after including controls), implying that there is insuf-
ficient evidence to support presence of moral hazard. This is surprising given that
increasing insuree’s liability in risk taking behaviour is seen as an obvious policy to
reduce moral hazard, and it seems that at least ex-post moral hazard is not likely to
be affected by contract features along these dimensions, though it should be noted
that difference in coverage of 10% versus 0% co-payment rate is too little to detect
asymmetries in information. Despite this, the claims department at MD was most
interested in these results, as they were convinced that setting the co-insurance rate
at 10-20% would significantly deter risky insurees from claiming.
V Discussion
Many of these results are naturally specific to the setting I am studying: an insur-
ance firm in Mongolia that (i) uses relatively little contingent pricing, (ii) faces less
than perfect competition in the formal insurance markets, (iii) offers insurance to
customers who have access to informal insurance and who (iv) have little trust or
experience in formal insurance markets. Secondly, the results are from an exper-
iment that estimates moral hazard only for lower coverage buyers. This section,
33Doing the same exercise for all accidents during the contract does not change the results.
Also, running the regressions separately for collision and third party suggests there is no evidence
of moral hazard for either risk.
43
despite speculative and not offering definitive conclusions, presents some suggestive
evidence on the extent to which these factors are relevant in explaining the findings.
A Contingent pricing
The firm uses only car value in screening consumers, though it observes and can po-
tentially use for pricing a wide range of individual and vehicle characteristics. While
there may be other settings in which an insurance firm does not use all the infor-
mation they hold (for example, see Finkelstein & Poterba, 2014), lack of contingent
pricing is quite extreme in our setting and therefore can explain the high degree of
adverse selection we observe: after all, if the company does not adjust prices ac-
cording to (observable) individual risk factors, those with observably higher risk are
more incentivised to self-select into higher coverages, artificially exacerbating the
coverage-risk correlation. In other words, rewarding “good” buyers and punishing
“bad” buyers could reduce the extent to which buyers self-select based on risk alone.
Potentially, “mispricing” and more generally fewer tools used to screen or incentivise
insurees to exert effort can also lead to over-estimation of moral hazard. If detected
adverse selection and moral hazard results are a consequence of pricing issues, this
would lead to different, potentially more targeted, policy recommendations. In par-
ticular, acquiring better skills or tools for pricing can both reduce adverse selection
and moral hazard and hence improve market outcomes. The extent to which this
would be the case is outside the scope of this research. Given that there is little
evidence of moral hazard in our setting, I discuss here some preliminary evidence
on why pricing issues are not likely to explain fully the adverse selection findings in
this paper.
Firstly, I check whether the adverse selection results change in a significant way
after controlling for the observables recorded in the company’s administrative data.
Since the firm does not take into account almost any of these factors, as discussed
previously, the correlation could be driven by individuals self-selecting on risk in
an unconstrained way. Then, if adverse selection is largely driven by observable
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risk factors among low and high coverage consumers, controlling for these factors
should considerably reduce the coverage-risk correlation. Still, as can be seen in all
even columns of regression tables, adding these controls has very little effect on the
magnitude of the adverse selection test statistic.
One could argue that these risk factors potentially have a non-linear effect on
risk and choice, and therefore I should adopt a more general approach in taking into
account these observables. I look at three related, but somewhat different, measures
of riskiness. I do not present all the tables here, but using different distributional as-
sumptions for the above measures (instead of poisson/logit/log normal for accident
frequency, dummy or loss size, respectively) or running regressions adding squared
terms yield similar results, suggesting functional form is not likely to drive these
core results.
Secondly, a related concern might be that while the results are robust to con-
trolling for observables that the firm might potentially want to price upon, the
reduced-form results might fail to detect adverse selection once the insurance com-
pany actually adopts pricing based on these observables. In that case potential
market failures due to asymmetric information can be corrected through better
pricing. It is hard to fully eliminate this possibility, but it seems that the observ-
ables in the administrative data have very little predictive power over actual risk
(see Table IV.1), with R2 at around 0.025. The firm could potentially try to collect
more information on buyers, but for the purpose of this research, we take these
as “private information”. So, given factors currently observable by the firm, there
seems to be little gain in adopting risk-adjusted pricing to start with, and there is
still significant residual explaining demand and risk outcomes.
Despite this suggestive evidence, I do not have enough data to evaluate effec-
tiveness of other tools, such as experience rating, that also have not been taken up
by firms.
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B Imperfect competition from other insurance firms and
adverse selection
I have argued that the market being studied seems to be one in which there is less
than perfect competition, especially given that only a few firms are consistently cap-
turing most of the market and consumers seem to engage relatively little in search
for alternative insurance providers. Despite that, from Table II.1 we can see that
the firm is actually making losses on the lowest two coverages, which around 80% of
the buyers purchased, and quite a high profit margin on the highest two products34.
On the other hand, the firm seems to face an increasing proportion of consumers
who search for its more comprehensive packages (see Table V.1). These are puzzling,
given that in equilibrium we expect to observe a higher price competition on the
products for which consumers search more35.
Overall, in simple models of insurance markets with asymmetric information only
on risk type, the correlation test studied here can be seen as a simple implication
of incentive compatibility: whenever there is one product covering more than the
other, higher risk individuals have a higher willingness to pay for the high coverage
product, and hence, the high coverage product will select higher risk insurees. This
would not happen without asymmetric information, and at first, such a positive
correlation test should be a valid test of the presence of asymmetric information
irrespective of the degree of competition in the market. However, Chiappori et al.
(2006) argue that detecting a positive correlation between riskiness and coverage
under competitive environments, a priori, would not suggest that such a correlation
would also be found under imperfectly competitive environments.
Moreover, one could entertain a few arguments on how the competitiveness of
the market might actually underestimate the adverse selection test statistic. Firstly,
it might be that in more competitive environments, firms would be pushed towards
34Note: the measure of profit does not include operational expenses and other indirect costs, so
need to be revised to take this into account.
35In this setting, riskier individuals both search more and choose higher coverages, which would
drive down profitability of higher coverages, further reinforcing the expectation in equilibrium.
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engaging more in contingent pricing to become more competitive, which would in
turn reduce the extent of adverse selection. This does not seem to be happening
here, since firms have not and are not engaging in price discrimination in response to
additional information about individual risk. Secondly, in response to higher com-
petition, firms might engage in better cream-skimming/lemon-dropping strategies in
a way that the set of consumers at the firm might become more homogeneous. This
can in turn reduce adverse selection detected at a given firm. This also does not
seem to be the case here, as firms are not explicitly denying insurance or punishing
“bad” risks. Finally, if there is multidimensional asymmetric information, say, both
in risk aversion and risk type, it is not entirely clear how firms would react to more
competition. Overall, this paper does not have much to add on these channels, given
the analysis focuses only on one product within one firm at a given point in time.
Whatever is the margin of competition among firms, one potential explanation
for finding adverse selection (which only uses data for buyers in the two lowest cov-
erages) could be that the firm might be facing fierce price competition. If that is
the case, then any market failures that might ensue are mainly driven by presence
of asymmetric information in a highly competitive market36. While I cannot rule
out this possibility, it seems that firstly, 1) asymmetric information is especially
important to study in competitive markets, where market failures are more likely
to be caused by asymmetric information and 2) adverse selection for theft is also
significant (despite theft being rare), while theft is only covered by higher cover-
ages for which the firm seems to face less effective competition. Finally, I check
whether individuals who ended up choosing MD after searching around for alterna-
tive providers display differential adverse selection to those who did not search, by
running the following regression for third party risk:
RiskiR = αR+β0RLow coverage choicei + β1RSearchi
+ β2RLow coverage choice× Searchi + γRXi + iR
36It should be noted that the firm does not have any legal obligations towards offering the most
basic coverage, but seems to want to do that to capture large part of the market in this relatively
new market, though it is considering to drop third party insurance.
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on the survey respondents who ended up being covered for risk R either due to self-
selection or due to the randomisation, where Searchi denotes number of alternative
providers a consumer surveyed. β2R < 0 indicates the extent to which those who
search around display higher adverse selection compared to those who do not search,
which is captured by β0R. Results are presented in Table IX.2. They suggest that
adverse selection among “non-searchers” is higher than among “searchers”, though
this difference is only significant for one measure of risk, claim frequency. Also,
“non-searchers” display, at least in magnitude, similar level of adverse selection as
the baseline. Naturally search here is likely to be endogenous, so we cannot inter-
pret this as causal impact of search on adverse selection, but it seems that at least
within the firm those reporting differential search behaviour do not seem to yield
significantly different observed adverse selection.
C Informal insurance
In Mongolia formal insurance markets are relatively new and therefore it is likely
that informal risk-sharing arrangements are still important. In the survey, there
were 1285 insured and 298 uninsured accidents reported as part of 3-year history
of accidents37. Around 30% of insured accidents were not taken to the insurance
company and 5% rejected by insurance providers. In combination with uninsured
accidents, these were either self-financed, financed through friends/family or trans-
fers from other drivers or left unresolved.
Given this, one could argue that adverse selection and moral hazard results pre-
sented here are specific to a setting where individuals often resort to insuring against
risks through informal means. So, I consider here potential interactions of access to
informal insurance with measures of asymmetric information. In theory, the extent
to which we over- or under-estimate moral hazard that is relevant to the firm de-
pends on the extent to which formal insurance overcrowds informal insurance (see
37Number of insured accidents overwhelm number of uninsured accidents. This is natural if
individuals tend to over-estimate their coverage or systematically report being covered when not
covered.
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Arnott & Stiglitz 1991) or “complements” it. If individuals can insure themselves
against risks through friends and family and therefore compensate for low coverage,
in other words formal and informal insurance are perfect substitutes, then individ-
uals may not respond to coverage upgrades as much, thus attenuating the moral
hazard statistic. This may lead us to not find evidence of moral hazard even when
it is present, and potentially lead to less developed formal insurance markets, if they
fail to provide incentives for insurees who have access to informal insurance. On the
other hand if individuals put a lot less effort in preventing accidents in response
to higher coverage, then it might be possible that they demand more informal in-
surance. Since we do not find any evidence of moral hazard, we check for the first
channel by running the moral hazard regression, but replacing the dependent vari-
able RiskiR by the number of accidents (insured) insured through informal means
in the duration of the contract. If informal insurance is replacing low coverage by
the firm, we should observe that receiving the higher coverage due to the randomi-
sation should decrease contributions from friends and family. Table IX.3 presents
the results, suggesting that those who were upgraded have less accidents covered by
friends/family, suggesting that lack of moral hazard result can be driven by formal
insurance substituting for informal insurance.
Informal insurance might also affect the adverse selection correlation, since the
friends and family providing informal sources of insurance might effectively act as
a competitor to the formal insurance markets (in particular, they might be a com-
petitor who is better informed about the individual’s riskiness than the firm). We
check whether those who had better access to informal insurance in the past dis-
play differential adverse selection compared to those who had not received informal
insurance, by running:
RiskiR = αR+β0RLow coverage choicei + β1RInformali
+ β2RLow coverage choice× Informali + γRXi + iR
on the survey respondents who end up covered for risk R either due to self-selection
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or due to the randomisation. Informali denotes number of accidents insured
through informal means prior to purchasing the experimental contract. From Ta-
ble IX.4 we see that there is no significant difference between those who had more
versus less access to informal insurance.
D Trust
Often, in insurance markets in developing countries, insurees claim they do not fully
trust the insurance company to pay (see UNCTAD report, 1993), and at least Cole et
al. (2013) suggest endorsements of insurance sellers by trusted bodies considerably
increases take up of insurance. In the current setting, 7% of consumers explicitly
responded in the survey that they do not trust MD, and more than 20% claimed
that they would not recommend the insurance product they bought to family mem-
bers and friends. Finally, 12% of survey respondents suggest they did not get any
payouts after claiming at some point in the past.
In this sense, if consumers do not fully trust the insurance company, and in
particular, if they do not trust the company to pay out after claiming, consumers
might be less willing to reduce effort in response to increases in coverage; at least,
they might be less willing to do so than if they expected to receive the payouts with
certainty. This could be a potential explanation for our findings of low moral hazard.
Trust could also affect adverse selection: if consumers know correctly that they
are not covered under low coverage products (which is not necessarily the case here,
see Enkhbayar (2015)), their lack of trust in receiving payouts might undermine
their perception of the high coverage product as indeed providing the additional
coverage, which might induce them to self-select as if the high coverage product
is relatively similar to a low coverage product. If this is the case, it is likely that
consumer choices between the two products would be less driven by their risk types,
and more driven by other non-risk related factors shifting preferences between the
two products. This would then lead us to find lower adverse selection test statistics.
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To check for these possibilities, I run the adverse selection regression and the
moral hazard regression interacting Choosing low insi and Upgradei with a proxy
for insuree trust in the insurance company. The proxy for trust I use is a dummy
variable indicating whether the survey respondent either said he would not recom-
mend the product to others, that he did not receive payouts or that he does not
trust the insurance company.
Again, clearly, these results are only suggestive, and I cannot rule out the possi-
bility that the results are driven instead by reverse causality and omitted variables -
it might be that the individual’s inherent riskiness drives trust, and it might be that
the results are driven by other factors correlated with trust and with self-selection
into different products/reaction to upgrades in coverage. Still, the results suggest
that these channels are not likely to be significant (see Tables IX.5 and IX.6 for AS
and MH results, respectively).
VI Conclusion
Since Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976), we think of the presence of
asymmetric information as arguably a prominent factor in explaining market fail-
ures. A large literature followed that attempts to understand whether asymmetric
information is present in insurance markets, typically focusing on detailed insurance
data that are most abundant in rich economies. Initially, studies emerged looking at
correlation between coverage and risk exposure, meanwhile recently empirical stud-
ies focus on different types of asymmetric information which may all lead to positive
coverage-risk correlation but have largely different policy implications. Also, what
seems to be important is that studies especially those using correlation approach
often yield conflicting and ambiguous results, with the implication that it might be
important to study market features that can explain why we might expect large
adverse selection/moral hazard in one market and less of it in other markets.
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In this paper, I employ a randomised experiment, randomly assigning individuals
who originally chose low insurance coverage to a higher insurance coverage. I do this
for a car insurance product at the largest insurance provider in Mongolia. I find with
this experiment that adverse selection plays an important role, potentially driving
out presumably low risk individuals out of the formal markets. On the other hand, I
find no evidence of moral hazard. Within the same product, I also randomly upgrade
individuals choosing 10% co-payment rate to insurance without any co-payment rate
and surprisingly do not find any evidence of adverse selection or moral hazard, while
perhaps with higher differences in co-payment rates informational asymmetries are
more likely to be detected. In health insurance markets, recent studies show that
co-payment is important in controlling for firm costs through reducing moral hazard,
while this seems less likely to be the case in this setting.
The main contribution of the paper is providing evidence of informational asym-
metries in a developing country where insurance markets have arguably similar char-
acteristics to those in other developing countries. In particular, I focus on four fea-
tures that can be common: 1) lack of contingent pricing due to technology/human
capital constraints, 2) imperfect competition, 3) lack of trust in insurance, 4) pres-
ence of informal risk-sharing arrangements. It might be then important to under-
stand whether these shared features are potentially driving adverse selection and
moral hazard results. While it is not possible, given the scope of this research and
the experiment, to rule out any of these factors, I discuss given rich survey data
how individuals with different degrees of access to informal insurance or levels of
trust self-select into different insurance packages. Taking into account some sug-
gestive evidence, it seems unlikely that lack of contingent pricing, at least on the
observables that the firm has access to, or imperfect competition is causing large
adverse selection. On the other hand, having access to formal insurance seems to
substitute for informal insurance, with individuals who have been upgraded from
no third party insurance to being covered against third party financing less of the
accidents through informal means. This can potentially explain why I did not find
any evidence of moral hazard.
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In summary, there are few potential avenues for future research, especially within
the context of developing countries. New markets in which both consumers and in-
surance providers are relatively inexperienced presents many margins through which
mispricing can affect the extent of asymmetric information. While in this paper the
observables to the firm do not seem to matter as much, other types of screening
mechanisms have not been discussed, for example experience rating. Many firms,
not just in insurance but also in credit markets, have difficulties in incorporating
experience rating and do not know how to price well different risks. Also, issues with
trust and past experience with insurance would be interesting to analyse within the
overall market, not just within one firm at one point in time, which often requires
coordination among many firms and the regulatory agencies, that is simply lacking
in many developing countries.
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Appendices
I Context: additional notes
A Existing contract types: corporate, bank vs experimental
Table I.1: Summary statistics on performance of different types of contracts are
presented here. I look at contracts that were sold during 07/2013-07/2014 and
respective claim behaviour during 07/2013-02/2015. Average profit is calculated
as average revenue minus average claim, and excludes any expenses outside claims.
Average revenue, claims and profits are converted from Mongolian Tugriks to pounds
£, using exchange rate of 1£ = 3000MNT.
Sale source No Pr(claim) Avg rev Claim size Payout Avg profit
Corporate 3172 0.368 252 276 200 179
Bank 2667 0.210 61 188 148 30
Experimental 1434 0.301 70 232 191 12.7
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Figure I.1: Number of contracts sold each month during 15/07/2013-15/07/2014,
grouped by contract type. July 2013 and July 2014 are both aggregated as July,
but can be seen as representative of the whole month as there is very little variation















B Existing bonus structure: agents vs managers
Around 100 agents were registered with Ulaanbaatar branches as of July 2013, how-
ever, only 10-15 turned out to be active sellers. This is due to a distortive bonus
mechanism at the firm, with agents receiving a bonus of around 15% of generated in-
come, while managers receive around 1.8%. Furthermore, with differentiated bonus
structure, managers often write contracts in the name of agents’, whom they bring
in, and collect their bonuses. Banks and brokers can also do so38. Due to income-
38This prevents researchers from identifying the actual seller and the volume of sales through
each channel. Only after the project has started it became clear that most contracts were sold
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based bonus system, lack of underwriting skills and limited monitoring, sellers do
not underwrite or evaluate risk, that is their incentives are misaligned with those of
the firm.
C “Bonus malus” within the contract
Uncommon type of “bonus malus” exists at MD, with the current coverage reducing
with each additional claim, but only in the duration of the current contract. Claims
in the current contract do not affect next period pricing. A brief explanation is the
following. An insuree can claim any amount up to the vehicle valuation. The firm
promises to pay out an amount equivalent to:
Loss val ∗ (1− c) ∗min
(
1,
Initial car val−∑Past claims
Car val at the time of accident
)
(3)
where c is the co-insurance rate. Hence with each claim the coverage within the
same contract decreases, with the insuree being allowed to “top-up” insurance.
D Claiming process
Generally, an insuree may need to provide different sets of materials in the claim
application, depending on the type of risk incurred. The insurance company will
only consider claim applications if no road traffic laws are violated by the insuree
and the insuree must inform the firm hotline of the accident while remaining at the
incident location39. The hotline team arrives at the location to inspect the situation,
make notes and inform of the set of documents the insuree needs to provide for a
claim application. Police reports are often requested to determine the faulty party,
so that the insurance company can rebate the claim from the faulty third party
(subrogation). The insuree may then choose the damage evaluator, who reports
both the loss and vehicle valuation at the time of the incident. These enter in the
payout equation (3). Survey respondents were distrustful of and dissatisfied with
the loss and the car valuations, suspecting firms might be colluding with damage
through banks and brokers.
39This is in line with police requirements to not move from the location of the accident due lack
of/low quality road traffic cameras, even on the main roads.
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evaluators. From discussions with interviewers, it was clear that many insurees also
thought that they could only claim once during the coverage period, so they delayed
claiming until loss size was justifiable.
E Seller’s manual with randomisation in place
All sellers underwent training and were given a manual on how to finalise insurance
sales with the randomisation in place. Few points from the manual worth mentioning
are:
1. Sellers should explain carefully what each coverage insures against.
2. Once the contract is signed and payment is finalised, both the seller and the
buyer send a text message to a server using their mobile phones (with some
additional information in the messages) and if the process is accepted by the
server, they both receive messages with the randomisation outcome.
3. The seller should note the randomisation outcome on the contract and have
the insuree sign in the box next to it.
4. If an insuree is upgraded to a higher coverage, the seller should explain carefully
what this implies.
5. If the message is sent before the contract starts or before a contract is finalised,
then the employee faces a punishment equivalent to a month’s minimum wage
per message.
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II Firm’s performance: by contract type
Table II.1: This table shows sales and profitability of type of insurance cover (initial
choice) for the experimental product. In particular, it shows the total number of
contracts sold, average profit, revenue and claim size (in pounds), calculated at the
end of the project.
Coverage Low Middle (10%) Middle (0%) High (10%) High (0%)
No of contracts 333 833 168 38 62
Profit -12 -21 17 186 198
Revenue 34 56 93 237 288
Claim 46 77 76 52 91
63
III Summary of administrative data: by coverage
choice
Table III.1: This table summarises variables collected in the administrative data, for each
coverage as chosen initially: low, middle (10% or 0% co-insurance) and high (10% or 0%
co-insurance) coverages.
Coverage Low Middle (10%) Middle (0%) High (10%) High (0%)
Number of contracts 322 810 166 38 62
Age 39.45 38.82 37.52 43.11 37.00
Male 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.45 0.47
Car value (£) 4272 4660 4717 7914 7591
Car age 11.67 10.66 10.71 9.61 9.89
Light colour 0.69 0.73 0.75 0.68 0.66
Number of upgraded 184 388 0 0 0
Upgrade rate 0.57 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00
No SMS 0.16 0.16 0.98 1.00 1.00
seller age 34.54 33.97 35.64 32.40 30.69
seller Male 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.42 0.34
seller experience 3.13 4.11 5.72 4.03 4.03
seller agent 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.07
buyer friend 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.29 0.29
Residence, brand and branch dummies
Bayangol (resid) 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.15
Bayanzurkh (resid) 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.26 0.31
Chingeltei (resid) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.08
HanUul (resid) 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.16
Sukhbaatar (resid) 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.13
Songinokhairkhan (resid) 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.05 0.15
NonUB (resid) 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03
NA (resid) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Asian (brand) 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.95
European (brand) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02
US (brand) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03
NA (brand) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bayangol (branch) 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.05
Bayanzurkh (branch) 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.19
Chingeltei (branch) 0.10 0.08 0.19 0.05 0.10
HanUul (branch) 0.29 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.08
Sunkhbaatar (branch) 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.13
Songinokhairkhan (branch) 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.13
Central (branch) 0.19 0.27 0.25 0.40 0.32
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IV Predictive power of observables for claim fre-
quency
Table IV.1: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table shows OLS regres-
sion estimates of claim frequency (aggregated across all types of vehicle risks) on a

































Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
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V Summary of survey data: by coverage choice
Table V.1: This table shows means of a number of variables collected in the survey,
for each coverage choice.
Coverage Low Middle (10%) Middle (0%) High (10%) High (0%)
Number of respondents 114 346 61 20 16
Drive to work 0.70 0.76 0.83 0.75 0.56
Safe work parking 0.54 0.51 0.54 0.60 0.67
Safe home parking 0.46 0.51 0.33 0.45 0.69
Anti-theft system 0.22 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.08
Driving experience 15.07 11.83 7.93 10.15 8.19
Engine size (cc) 2362 1968 1946 1936 1873
Daily usage (km) 50.43 44.97 42.04 27.84 34.42
Risk loving 47.98 48.03 50.08 46.50 45.00
Smoker 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.20 0.12
Use mobile while driving 0.70 0.76 0.80 0.80 0.75
Business ownership 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.50 0.38
Seatbelt usage 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.95 0.94
Last month over spend 0.45 0.40 0.46 0.55 0.69
Last year over spend 0.26 0.28 0.20 0.40 0.50
No of other types of insur 1.51 1.34 1.51 1.50 1.94
No of properties 1.36 1.30 1.28 1.50 1.25
No of vehicles 1.53 1.44 1.41 1.50 1.62
University education 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.70 0.69
Loan 0.45 0.43 0.36 0.55 0.31
Car loan 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.08
Hh income (£/month) 396 427 382 513 508
Insuree income (£/month) 367 391 367 597 440
Averse to risky acts 45.47 44.63 43.23 44.60 47.50
Averse to breaking law 15.85 15.88 15.95 15.55 15.50
No of drivers in household 1.96 2.00 1.93 2.10 2.00
No of drivers 1.64 1.66 1.57 1.47 1.85
Paid insurance alone 0.89 0.87 0.83 0.84 0.56
Bought in person 0.87 0.87 0.76 0.84 0.69
Trust 0.79 0.72 0.67 0.68 0.62
No of insured risks 0.35 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.75
No of uninsured risks 0.76 0.94 1.10 1.05 1.06
Search for other provider(s) 0.22 0.34 0.38 0.53 0.62
Did not claim when insured 0.47 0.45 0.49 0.43 0.25
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VI Balance tables: by experiment type
Table VI.1: Balance table for Experiment 1: those who stayed in the lowest coverage
versus those who were upgraded to middle coverage (at 10% co-insurance rate). The
first column shows the pre-randomisation variables. I have included seller-specific
characteristics and days insured to see if upgraded contracts were sold differentially
in terms of seller type or timing throughout the project.
No upgrade Upgrade std.diff z
Male 0.65 0.70 0.12 1.03
Age 39.47 39.33 -0.01 -0.10
Car age 11.56 11.64 0.02 0.18
Car value 11552985.07 13821954.17 0.13 1.19
Bayangol (resid) 0.15 0.16 0.03 0.30
Bayanzurkh (resid) 0.22 0.19 -0.08 -0.68
Chingeltei (resid) 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.70
HanUul (resid) 0.15 0.15 -0.01 -0.09
Sukhbaatar (resid) 0.12 0.11 -0.01 -0.13
Songinokhairkhan (resid) 0.20 0.20 -0.01 -0.08
NonUB (resid) 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.20
Asia (brand) 0.95 0.95 0.02 0.22
Europe (brand) 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.56
US (brand) 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.26
NA (brand) 0.01 -0.00 -0.19 -1.70 .
Light colour 0.63 0.71 0.17 1.51
seller male 0.28 0.25 -0.08 -0.68
seller age 35.08 34.01 -0.10 -0.88
seller experience 3.30 2.98 -0.07 -0.62
seller agent 0.19 0.09 -0.28 -2.43 *
Days insured 148.79 175.05 0.27 2.38 *
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Table VI.2: Balance table for Experiment 2: those who stayed in middle cover-
age versus those who were upgraded to the highest coverage (at 10% co-insurance
rate). The first column shows the pre-randomisation variables. I have included
seller-specific characteristics and days insured to see if upgraded contracts were sold
differentially in terms of seller type or timing throughout the project.
No upgrade Upgrade std.diff z
Male 0.61 0.64 0.08 0.86
Age 39.02 38.62 -0.03 -0.39
Car age 10.65 10.67 0.00 0.05
Car value 13995352.80 13638082.90 -0.02 -0.25
Bayangol (resid) 0.25 0.22 -0.06 -0.68
Bayanzurkh (resid) 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.95
Chingeltei (resid) 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.90
HanUul (resid) 0.15 0.13 -0.05 -0.54
Sukhbaatar (resid) 0.12 0.12 -0.01 -0.09
Songinokhairkhan (resid) 0.20 0.17 -0.07 -0.76
NonUB (resid) 0.02 0.03 0.10 1.11
Asia (brand) 0.95 0.96 0.07 0.81
Europe (brand) 0.04 0.02 -0.11 -1.29
US (brand) 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.62
Light colour 0.74 0.74 -0.00 -0.04
seller male 0.22 0.24 0.05 0.53
seller age 34.70 33.04 -0.16 -1.79 .
seller experience 4.02 4.42 0.08 0.89
seller agent 0.25 0.12 -0.30 -3.43 ***
Days insured 164.80 177.07 0.12 1.36
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Table VI.3: Balance table for Experiment 3: those who stayed at 10% co-insurance
rate in the middle coverage versus those who were upgraded to no co-insurance
rate within the same cover of risks. The first column shows the pre-randomisation
variables. I have included seller-specific characteristics and days insured to see if up-
graded contracts were sold differentially in terms of seller type or timing throughout
the project.
No upgrade Upgrade std.diff z
Male 0.61 0.65 0.09 1.08
Age 39.02 38.85 -0.01 -0.17
Car age 10.65 10.84 0.05 0.60
Car value 13995352.80 13726779.93 -0.02 -0.19
Bayangol (resid) 0.25 0.22 -0.07 -0.82
Bayanzurkh (resid) 0.16 0.17 0.04 0.45
Chingeltei (resid) 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.79
HanUul (resid) 0.15 0.14 -0.03 -0.34
NonUB (resid) 0.02 0.03 0.11 1.33
Sukhbaatar (resid) 0.12 0.10 -0.08 -0.91
Songinokhairkhan (resid) 0.20 0.21 0.03 0.34
Asia (brand) 0.95 0.97 0.11 1.26
Europe (brand) 0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.76
US (brand) 0.01 0.00 -0.12 -1.42
Light colour 0.74 0.71 -0.06 -0.75
seller male 0.22 0.30 0.19 2.23 *
seller age 34.70 33.42 -0.12 -1.42
seller experience 4.02 4.03 0.00 0.02
seller agent 0.25 0.12 -0.32 -3.76 ***
Days insured 164.80 195.55 0.30 3.48 ***
69
VII Balance tables: survey respondents versus
non-respondents
Table VII.1: This table examines whether respondents versus differ in observable
characteristics to non-respondents. A large set of characteristics are included, in
particular whether an individual was randomised to higher coverage and her risk
measures.
Survey respondents Non-respondents std.diff z
Upgrade 0.44 0.41 -0.06 -1.14
Claim freq 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.09
Claim size 153348.33 132113.29 -0.03 -0.50
Collision freq 0.17 0.20 0.06 1.08
Third party freq 0.11 0.09 -0.08 -1.45
Theft freq 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.11
Male 0.61 0.63 0.04 0.72
Age 40.37 37.82 -0.22 -3.93 ***
Car age 10.97 10.77 -0.05 -0.95
Car value 12747790.16 15393225.15 0.15 2.73 **
Bayangol (resid) 0.24 0.19 -0.13 -2.35 *
Bayanzurkh (resid) 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.05
Chingeltei (resid) 0.13 0.11 -0.05 -0.97
HanUul (resid) 0.12 0.16 0.11 1.96 .
Sukhbaatar (resid) 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.04
Songinokhairkhan (resid) 0.20 0.18 -0.06 -1.11
NonUB (resid) 0.00 0.05 0.31 5.60 ***
Asia (brand) 0.96 0.95 -0.03 -0.61
Europe (brand) 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.36
US (brand) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.18
NA (brand) 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.18
Light colour 0.72 0.71 -0.04 -0.67
seller male 0.27 0.25 -0.06 -1.06
seller age 33.54 34.50 0.09 1.66 .
seller experience 4.03 4.11 0.01 0.24
seller agent 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.37
Days insured 173.92 175.69 0.02 0.31
buyer friend 0.27 0.27 -0.01 -0.20
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Table VII.2: This table examines whether respondents versus differ in observable
characteristics to non-respondents, excluding the highest 1% of car values. A large
set of characteristics are included, in particular whether an individual was ran-
domised to higher coverage and her risk measures.
Survey respondents Non-respondents std.diff z
Upgrade 0.44 0.42 -0.05 -0.97
Claim freq 0.29 0.30 0.01 0.17
Claim size 153889.24 134355.89 -0.03 -0.45
Collision freq 0.17 0.21 0.07 1.20
Third party freq 0.11 0.09 -0.08 -1.49
Theft freq 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.08
Male 0.62 0.63 0.03 0.56
Age 40.40 37.59 -0.24 -4.31 ***
Car age 11.00 10.98 -0.01 -0.13
Car value 12404748.85 12941602.14 0.05 0.86
Bayangol (resid) 0.24 0.19 -0.13 -2.34 *
Bayanzurkh (resid) 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.10
Chingeltei (resid) 0.13 0.12 -0.05 -0.84
HanUul (resid) 0.13 0.15 0.08 1.50
Sukhbaatar (resid) 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.12
Songinokhairkhan (resid) 0.20 0.18 -0.05 -0.95
NonUB (resid) 0.00 0.05 0.31 5.65 ***
Asia (brand) 0.96 0.96 -0.01 -0.26
Europe (brand) 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05
US (brand) 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.03
NA (brand) 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.19
Light colour 0.73 0.72 -0.02 -0.39
seller male 0.27 0.25 -0.06 -1.08
seller age 33.56 34.53 0.09 1.67 .
seller experience 4.04 4.08 0.01 0.13
seller agent 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.39
Days insured 174.08 176.25 0.02 0.38
buyer friend 0.27 0.26 -0.02 -0.38
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Figure VII.1: Density plots of age and car value: for all buyers versus just survey
respondents.












































Table VII.3: This table presents multiple tests comparing requested quantiles for
age distributions of two groups: group 1 includes survey respondents and group 2
includes all buyers (with non-missing age observations). The test uses Harrell-Davis
estimator in conjunction with a percentile bootstrap. The results were obtained
using WRS package in R.
q n1 n2 est1 est2 est1-est2 ci.low ci.up pcrit p.value signif
0.10 569 1410 26.22 25.49 0.73 -0.48 1.71 0.02 0.22 NO
0.20 569 1410 29.04 28.14 0.90 -0.24 1.87 0.01 0.15 NO
0.30 569 1410 31.51 30.77 0.74 -0.44 2.09 0.03 0.22 NO
0.40 569 1410 34.48 33.62 0.86 -0.54 2.33 0.05 0.26 NO
0.50 569 1410 38.19 36.63 1.56 -0.34 3.37 0.01 0.11 NO
0.60 569 1410 41.86 40.17 1.69 0.16 3.50 0.01 0.03 NO
0.70 569 1410 46.10 43.68 2.42 0.47 4.19 0.01 0.01 NO
0.80 569 1410 51.85 49.00 2.85 0.44 5.14 0.01 0.02 NO
0.90 569 1410 58.20 55.82 2.38 -0.03 5.80 0.01 0.06 NO
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Figure VII.2: This table presents differences between quantiles of age distributions
for survey respondents (Group 1) versus all buyers (Group 2). In particular, it shows
the confidence intervals for each quantile: upper and lower confidence intervals are
denoted by + signs. X-axis and Y-axis denote age (in years) and difference in
quantiles, respectively.






































VIII Reduced form tests
A Adverse selection
Third party
Table VIII.1: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are third
party claim frequency, probability and size. Row 1 of columns 1, 3 and 5 show
estimates of effect of riskiness on coverage choice, controlling for log(Days insured)
only. Row 1 of columns 2, 4 and 6 show such estimates additionally controlling for
all covariates recorded from the contracts as well as seller characteristics.
Claim frequency Prob of claim Claim size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low coverage choice -0.095∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -1.006∗∗∗ -0.872∗∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028) (0.322) (0.345)
log(Days insured) 0.152 0.232 0.086 0.154 0.812 1.231∗
(0.164) (0.185) (0.127) (0.145) (0.663) (0.647)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 606 595 606 595 606 595
R2 0.013 0.064
Log Likelihood -261.524 -237.225 -232.233 -210.932
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
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Theft
Table VIII.2: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are theft
claim frequency, probability and size from the administrative claims data. Row
1 of columns 1, 3 and 5 show estimates of effect of riskiness on coverage choice,
controlling for log(Days insured) only. Row 1 of columns 2, 4 and 6 show such
estimates additionally controlling for most covariates. As theft is rare we exclude
here controls on car colour, residence and brand dummies.
Claim frequency Prob of claim Claim size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low coverage choice 0.025∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.356∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.116) (0.214)
log(Days insured) 0.458 0.535 0.447 0.497 1.534∗∗ 1.316∗∗
(0.554) (0.633) (0.536) (0.579) (0.691) (0.648)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 228 223 228 223 228 223
R2 0.011 0.049
Log Likelihood -21.801 -18.916 -21.709 -18.588
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
Table VIII.3: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are 3-
year history of theft frequency, dummy and loss size. The regression is only ran
on survey respondents. Row 1 of columns 1, 3 and 5 show estimates of effect of
riskiness on coverage choice controlling for log(Days insured). Row 1 of columns 2,
4 and 6 show such estimates additionally controlling for all covariates recorded from
the contracts as well as seller groups.
Acc frequency Prob of acc Acc size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low coverage choice -0.327∗ -0.468∗ -0.266∗∗ -0.317∗∗ -1.480 -2.213
(0.193) (0.270) (0.123) (0.130) (1.428) (1.464)
log(Days insured) 0.050 0.170 0.005 0.033 1.397 1.698
(0.721) (0.757) (0.511) (0.520) (6.003) (6.706)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 97
R2 0.013 0.088
Log Likelihood -80.157 -76.163 -55.735 -52.450
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
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Co-insurance rate
Table VIII.4: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are colli-
sion and TP claim frequency, probability and size. Row 1 of columns 1, 3 and 5 show
estimates of effect of riskiness on coverage choice controlling for log(Days insured).
Row 1 of columns 2, 4 and 6 show such estimates additionally controlling for all
covariates recorded from the contracts as well as seller groups.
Claim frequency Prob of claim Claim size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low coverage choice 0.027 0.037 0.060 0.058 0.510 0.525
(0.073) (0.076) (0.050) (0.051) (0.574) (0.569)
log(Days insured) 1.388∗∗∗ 1.410∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗ 0.611∗ 3.468∗∗∗ 2.348
(0.461) (0.477) (0.313) (0.326) (1.283) (1.595)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 364 356 364 356 364 356
R2 0.012 0.060
Log Likelihood -337.076 -324.021 -232.071 -223.144




Table VIII.5: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are third
party accident frequency, probability and loss size during the contract from the
survey data. Row 1 of columns 1, 3 and 5 show estimates of effect of high coverage
on riskiness controlling for log(Days insured). Row 1 of columns 2, 4 and 6 show
such estimates additionally controlling for all covariates recorded from the contracts
as well as seller groups.
Acc frequency Prob of acc Acc size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgrade -0.099 -0.133 -0.091 -0.104 -0.698 -0.390
(0.094) (0.124) (0.078) (0.079) (0.827) (0.804)
log(Days insured) 0.062 0.108 0.050 0.086∗ 0.251 0.631
(0.057) (0.066) (0.048) (0.050) (0.462) (0.400)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 113 113 113 113 113 113
R2 0.008 0.224
Log Likelihood -62.981 -51.358 -55.927 -42.619
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
Table VIII.6: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are
third party accident frequency, probability and loss size during the contract from
the survey data. Here accidents with non-positive losses are excluded. Row 1 of
columns 1, 3 and 5 show estimates of effect of high coverage on riskiness controlling
for log(Days insured). Row 1 of columns 2, 4 and 6 show such estimates additionally
controlling for all covariates recorded from the contracts as well as seller groups.
Acc frequency Prob of acc Acc size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgrade -0.083 -0.074 -0.076 -0.055 -0.698 -0.390
(0.086) (0.102) (0.073) (0.072) (0.827) (0.804)
log(Days insured) 0.038 0.077 0.027 0.055 0.251 0.631
(0.050) (0.058) (0.042) (0.043) (0.462) (0.400)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 113 113 113 113 113 113
R2 0.008 0.224
Log Likelihood -56.996 -44.956 -50.479 -37.720
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
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Theft
Table VIII.7: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are theft
accident frequency, probability and loss size during the contract from the survey
data. Row 1 of columns 1, 3 and 5 show estimates of effect of high coverage on
riskiness controlling for log(Days insured). Row 1 of columns 2, 4 and 6 show such
estimates additionally controlling for all covariates recorded from the contracts as
well as seller groups.
Acc frequency Prob of acc Acc size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgrade 0.044 0.042 0.038 0.024 0.549 0.347
(0.036) (0.040) (0.032) (0.026) (0.394) (0.391)
log(Days insured) 0.084∗∗ 0.060∗ 0.067∗ 0.045∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.027) (0.128) (0.120)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 250 249 250 249 250 249
R2 0.032 0.130
Log Likelihood -49.689 -34.224 -42.844 -28.143
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
Table VIII.8: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are theft
accident frequency, probability and loss size during the contract from the survey
data. Here accidents with non-positive losses are excluded. Row 1 of columns
1, 3 and 5 show estimates of effect of high coverage on riskiness controlling for
log(Days insured). Row 1 of columns 2, 4 and 6 show such estimates additionally
controlling for all covariates recorded from the contracts as well as seller groups.
Acc frequency Prob of acc Acc size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgrade 0.038 0.034 0.044 0.028 0.549 0.347
(0.033) (0.038) (0.031) (0.023) (0.394) (0.391)
log(Days insured) 0.070∗ 0.054 0.059∗ 0.042 0.384∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.035) (0.033) (0.026) (0.128) (0.120)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 250 249 250 249 250 249
R2 0.032 0.130
Log Likelihood -44.054 -27.847 -39.960 -22.147
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
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Co-insurance rate
Table VIII.9: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are
collision and third party claim frequency, probability and size. Row 1 of columns
1, 3 and 5 show estimates of effect of higher coverage on riskiness controlling for
log(Days insured). Row 1 of columns 2, 4 and 6 show such estimates additionally
controlling for all covariates recorded from the contracts as well as seller groups.
Claim frequency Prob of claim Claim size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgrade 0.039 0.003 0.069∗ 0.043 0.823 0.465
(0.059) (0.059) (0.041) (0.040) (0.523) (0.538)
log(Days insured) 1.213∗∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗ 0.578∗∗ 3.729∗∗ 4.488∗∗∗
(0.353) (0.388) (0.229) (0.229) (1.472) (1.444)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 620 608 620 608 620 608
R2 0.012 0.069
Log Likelihood -564.941 -534.714 -387.594 -361.246
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
Table VIII.10: This table summarises the various tests for adverse selection and
moral hazard for different vehicle insurance contracts. ∗ implies results hold for
subset of risk measures, not all.
“Third party” “Theft” Co-insurance rate
Adverse selection YES YES* NO
Moral hazard NO NO NO
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MH estimates (recent contracts included/excluded)
Figure VIII.1: This figure shows moral hazard results for third party and theft ex-
cluding later contracts for which we have incomplete claims data. X-axis indicates
the extent to which we include later contracts, going to the right would result in
including only very early contracts. The Y-axis denote the estimates of moral haz-
ard, effect of higher contract on riskiness. Black round dots are for theft, while blue
and red are for third party (red denotes significant, while blue denotes estimates not
significantly different from 0).
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IX Tables for discussion
Table IX.1: This table shows how adverse selection interacts with search intensity, where search intensity is measured
by number of firms a consumer evaluated before choosing the product under consideration. For third party the
regression is ran on low coverage buyers and middle coverage consumers (irrespective of co-insurance rate) to ensure
higher sample size.
TP
Claim frequency Prob of claim Claim size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low coverage choice -0.104∗∗ -0.111∗∗ -0.070 -0.071 -0.761 -0.683
(0.053) (0.055) (0.048) (0.048) (0.540) (0.569)
Search 0.011 0.014 0.018 0.019 0.243 0.267
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.193) (0.179)
Low coverage choice × Search 0.043 0.071∗ 0.031 0.047 0.347 0.498
(0.039) (0.043) (0.034) (0.034) (0.546) (0.514)
log(Days insured) 0.019 0.018 -0.006 -0.005 -0.043 -0.051
(0.026) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.246) (0.244)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 382 381 382 381 382 381
R2 0.013 0.073
Log Likelihood -188.068 -172.547 -159.979 -146.993
Theft
Low coverage choice -0.292 -0.409 -0.167 -0.281 -0.741 -1.605
(0.258) (0.334) (0.165) (0.182) (1.774) (1.661)
Search 0.059 0.090 0.098 0.091 1.020 1.029
(0.074) (0.078) (0.068) (0.070) (0.916) (0.937)
Low coverage choice×Search -0.022 -0.033 -0.064 -0.047 -0.604 -0.517
(0.088) (0.092) (0.072) (0.074) (1.023) (1.060)
log(Days insured) 0.049 0.096 0.047 0.053 0.545 0.708
(0.074) (0.082) (0.054) (0.054) (0.581) (0.626)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95
R2 0.047 0.099
Log Likelihood -77.414 -73.374 -51.659 -48.651
Co-insurance rate
Low coverage choice 0.192 0.239 0.166∗ 0.163∗ 1.769 1.790
(0.140) (0.146) (0.089) (0.092) (1.089) (1.095)
Search 0.077 0.077 0.077∗ 0.075∗ 0.918∗ 0.894∗
(0.053) (0.056) (0.041) (0.044) (0.535) (0.515)
Low coverage choice×Search -0.015 -0.002 -0.024 -0.018 -0.069 0.049
(0.063) (0.069) (0.048) (0.051) (0.681) (0.670)
log(Days insured) 0.078 0.121 -0.002 -0.003 -0.074 -0.108
(0.077) (0.086) (0.045) (0.049) (0.532) (0.611)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150
R2 0.072 0.119
Log Likelihood -137.765 -131.920 -89.925 -86.527
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
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Table IX.2: This table presents tests of moral hazard, by considering as the dependent variable alternative measures
of effort. In particular instead of using accidents as measure of effort, I use a dummy for whether an individual
engages in activities that are likely to reduce TP and theft risks: taking value 1 if individuals typically parks the







log(Days insured) -0.013 -0.037
(0.060) (0.042)
Other controls NO YES
Observations 92 92




log(Days insured) 0.026 0.016
(0.036) (0.026)
Other controls NO YES
Observations 204 203




log(Days insured) 0.059 0.056
(0.040) (0.026)
Other controls NO YES
Observations 217 216
Log Likelihood -143.276 -129.901
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
Table IX.3: This table shows the extent to which coverage upgrades affect informal insurance. Informal insurance
is measured through number of accidents that are naturally covered by insurance, but were instead insured through
other means.
TP
Informal freq Prob of informal Informal size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgrade -0.174∗∗ -0.289∗ -0.152∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -1.466∗ -1.301∗
(0.088) (0.161) (0.074) (0.071) (0.752) (0.746)
log(Days insured) 0.048 0.105∗ 0.046 0.093∗ 0.200 0.523
(0.050) (0.063) (0.044) (0.052) (0.431) (0.368)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 113 113 113 113 113 113
R2 0.037 0.232
Log Likelihood -52.761 -42.570 -48.560 -35.602
Theft
Upgrade 0.020 0.017 0.014 0.005 0.246 0.065
(0.032) (0.034) (0.028) (0.024) (0.342) (0.354)
log(Days insured) 0.064∗ 0.043 0.049∗ 0.032 0.293∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗
(0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.023) (0.111) (0.103)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 250 249 250 249 250 249
R2 0.017 0.112
Log Likelihood -45.777 -31.110 -38.777 -25.202
Co-insurance rate
Upgrade 0.002 0.006 0.031 0.038 0.592 0.799
(0.074) (0.078) (0.056) (0.053) (0.667) (0.636)
log(Daysinsured) 0.066 0.162∗∗∗ 0.047 0.088∗∗ 0.509∗ 0.809∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.054) (0.033) (0.037) (0.293) (0.299)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 268 267 268 267 268 267
R2 0.012 0.146
Log Likelihood -208.793 -178.435 -148.209 -125.246
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
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Table IX.4: This table shows how adverse selection interacts with past informal insurance, where Informal is
number of accidents that were financed through means other than formal insurance. For third party the regression
is ran on low coverage buyers and middle coverage consumers (irrespective of co-insurance rate) to ensure higher
sample size.
TP
Claim frequency Prob of claim Claim size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low coverage choice -0.090∗ -0.087∗ -0.061 -0.056 -0.812 -0.626
(0.049) (0.052) (0.044) (0.046) (0.619) (0.642)
Informal -0.099∗∗ -0.088∗ -0.082∗∗ -0.076∗ -0.801∗∗∗ -0.722∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.049) (0.039) (0.039) (0.267) (0.273)
Low coverage choice × Informal 0.025 0.029 0.022 0.021 0.250 0.030
(0.186) (0.177) (0.139) (0.128) (0.853) (0.908)
log(Days insured) 0.022 0.016 -0.004 -0.006 -0.038 -0.036
(0.026) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.233) (0.228)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 393 392 393 392 393 392
R2 0.005 0.060
Log Likelihood -194.152 -179.208 -164.635 -152.584
Theft
Low coverage choice -0.683∗ -0.779 -0.198∗∗ -0.186∗ -1.445 -1.557
(0.410) (0.581) (0.100) (0.108) (1.243) (1.191)
Informal 0.286∗∗∗ 0.275 1.739 2.610 4.586∗∗∗ 4.870∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.280) (235.292) (782.528) (1.009) (1.125)
Low coverage choice× Informal 0.325∗∗ 0.405 0.087 0.242 2.606∗∗ 2.190
(0.137) (0.318) (287.193) (900.411) (1.210) (1.344)
log(Days insured) 0.084 0.111 0.085 0.060 0.729∗∗ 0.662
(0.077) (0.101) (0.057) (0.048) (0.361) (0.428)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 97
R2 0.493 0.550
Log Likelihood -55.558 -51.835 -27.563 -22.279
Co-insurance rate
Low coverage choice 0.085 0.127 0.079 0.060 1.329 1.198
(0.127) (0.133) (0.089) (0.092) (1.252) (1.279)
Informal -0.384∗∗ -0.358∗∗ -0.177∗ -0.194∗∗ -1.345∗∗∗ -1.366∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.174) (0.093) (0.098) (0.427) (0.456)
Low coverage choice× Informal 0.229 0.205 0.095 0.117 0.261 0.296
(0.187) (0.186) (0.100) (0.103) (0.640) (0.677)
log(Days insured) 0.054 0.072 -0.017 -0.017 -0.268 -0.253
(0.080) (0.085) (0.048) (0.050) (0.532) (0.600)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155
R2 0.067 0.117
Log Likelihood -136.726 -131.985 -91.986 -87.795
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
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Table IX.5: This table shows how adverse selection of third party interacts with the degree of distrust, where
Distrust is a dummy that takes value 1 if individual claims any one of the following: 1) would not offer the product
to others, 2) explicitly report not of trusting the company, 3) had in the past accidents for which claims were not
paid out. For third party the regression is ran on low coverage buyers and middle coverage consumers (irrespective
of co-insurance rate) to ensure higher sample size.
TP
Claim frequency Prob of claim Claim size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low coverage choice -0.076 -0.057 -0.039 -0.025 -0.597 -0.331
(0.057) (0.065) (0.053) (0.058) (0.781) (0.797)
Distrust -0.100∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.069∗ -0.080∗∗ -0.935∗ -1.105∗∗
(0.046) (0.048) (0.040) (0.040) (0.518) (0.526)
Low coverage choice × Distrust -0.190∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.916 -1.188
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.865) (0.920)
log(Days insured) 0.014 0.016 -0.014 -0.011 -0.143 -0.106
(0.029) (0.031) (0.022) (0.023) (0.259) (0.261)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 339 338 339 338 339 338
R2 0.018 0.080
Log Likelihood -171.016 -157.083 -142.717 -131.545
Theft
Low coverage choice -0.396 -1.220 -0.395∗∗ -0.491∗∗∗ -3.644∗ -5.226∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.814) (0.162) (0.118) (2.142) (2.019)
Distrust -0.049 -0.519 -0.163 -0.256∗ -3.881 -5.285∗∗
(0.246) (0.418) (0.169) (0.142) (2.654) (2.687)
Low coverage choice×Distrust 0.062 1.080 0.187 0.392∗∗∗ 4.186 6.884∗∗
(0.349) (1.205) (0.233) (0.135) (3.006) (2.858)
log(Days insured) 0.035 0.056 0.020 -0.006 0.305 0.088
(0.087) (0.095) (0.059) (0.059) (0.705) (0.770)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 83 83 83 83 83 83
R2 0.047 0.232
Log Likelihood -73.455 -64.100 -49.203 -41.043
Co-insurance rate
Low coverage choice 0.085 0.218 0.113 0.143 1.374 1.804
(0.134) (0.149) (0.095) (0.095) (1.408) (1.387)
Distrust -0.583∗∗ -0.530∗ -0.244∗ -0.256∗∗ -2.878∗∗ -2.933∗
(0.276) (0.280) (0.128) (0.130) (1.463) (1.516)
Low coverage choice×Distrust 0.463 0.154 0.055 0.015 0.379 -0.192
(0.642) (0.474) (0.188) (0.192) (1.989) (1.963)
log(Days insured) 0.059 0.080 -0.011 -0.006 -0.190 -0.065
(0.081) (0.093) (0.048) (0.052) (0.562) (0.663)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 137 137 137 137 137 137
R2 0.065 0.134
Log Likelihood -123.907 -116.650 -82.392 -77.052
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
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Table IX.6: This table shows how moral hazard interacts with the degree of distrust, where Distrust is a dummy
that takes value 1 if individual claims any one of the following: 1) would not offer the product to others, 2) explicitly
report not of trusting the company, 3) had in the past accidents for which claims were not paid out. The regression
is ran on low coverage buyers.
TP
Claim frequency Prob of claim Claim size
Poisson logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgrade -0.111 -0.174 -0.107 -0.142 -0.358 -0.288
(0.119) (0.164) (0.098) (0.092) (1.230) (1.208)
Distrust -0.279 -0.290 -0.244∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -2.302∗ -2.910∗∗
(0.182) (0.199) (0.123) (0.093) (1.346) (1.365)
Upgrade × Distrust 0.258 0.683 0.176 0.282 -0.633 1.183
(0.652) (1.329) (0.278) (0.199) (1.543) (1.603)
log(Days insured) 0.054 0.133∗ 0.042 0.099∗ 0.068 0.875∗
(0.067) (0.080) (0.053) (0.059) (0.527) (0.488)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 97
R2 0.073 0.306
Log Likelihood -58.795 -47.523 -51.258 -36.913
Theft
Upgrade 0.060 0.068 0.036 0.021 0.459 0.204
(0.052) (0.063) (0.044) (0.036) (0.559) (0.576)
Distrust -0.027 -0.004 -0.009 0.008 -0.205 -0.170
(0.052) (0.068) (0.043) (0.047) (0.340) (0.354)
Upgrade × Distrust 0.040 0.040 0.048 0.049 0.673 0.794
(0.121) (0.132) (0.103) (0.089) (1.060) (1.085)
log(Days insured) 0.104∗∗ 0.074 0.086∗∗ 0.058∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.046) (0.044) (0.035) (0.169) (0.147)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 211 210 211 210 211 210
R2 0.044 0.151
Log Likelihood -49.728 -33.766 -39.939 -25.574
Co-insurance rate
Upgrade 0.163 0.193 0.146∗ 0.163∗∗ 1.805∗ 1.999∗
(0.120) (0.127) (0.081) (0.080) (1.054) (1.059)
Distrust -0.073 -0.074 0.002 -0.005 0.006 -0.038
(0.119) (0.126) (0.080) (0.082) (0.978) (1.013)
Upgrade × Distrust -0.220 -0.257∗ -0.180∗ -0.194∗∗ -2.441 -2.698
(0.144) (0.139) (0.098) (0.095) (1.683) (1.831)
log(Days insured) 0.095 0.086 0.017 0.011 0.224 0.145
(0.061) (0.065) (0.037) (0.038) (0.434) (0.437)
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 230 229 230 229 230 229
R2 0.022 0.069
Log Likelihood -212.669 -203.448 -144.488 -137.210
Notes: significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, respectively.
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